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Traditional security models partition the security universe into two distinct and
completely separate worlds: high and low level. However, this partition is absolute and
complete. The partition of security domains into high and low is too simplistic for more
complex cyber-physical systems (CPS). Absolute divisions are conceptually clean, but they
do not reflect the real world. Security partitions often overlap, frequently provide for the
high level to have complete access to the low level, and aremore complex than an impervious
wall. The traditional models that handle situations where the security domains are complex
or the threat space is ill defined are limited to mutually exclusive worlds. These models
are limited to accepting commands from a single source in a system but the CPS accepts
commands from multiple sources.
This paper utilizesMultiple SecurityDomainNondeducibility (MSDND) as amodel
to determine information flow among multiple partitions, such as those that occur in a CPS.
MSDND is applied to selected aspects of Traffic Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS)
and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) air traffic surveillance systems
under various physical and cyber security vulnerabilities to determine when the actual
operational state can, and cannot be, deduced. It is also used to determine what additional
information inputs and flight physics are needed to determine the actual operational state.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The aviation industry is going through a major transformation to meet increasing
air traffic, societal, and business demands. Major transformation examples include the
e-enabled aircraft and next-generation air transport system [2, 3].
The e-enabled aircraft is envisioned as an intelligent nodewith seamlessmobility in a
global network of ground, air, space infrastructures [4, 5, 6, 7]. TheBoeingB787 is a seminal
example which combines the power of integrated information and communications systems
to drive operational efficiency, enhance revenue, and streamline airplanemaintenance. Next-
generation air transport systems are aimed at applying the cyber aspect to infrastructures,
hardware, personnel, and processes.
The increasing safety and security concerns, such as terrorism, deterioratingweather,
wildlife collisions, pilot , system malfunction and ground crew fatigue have become a
major concern for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). CPS [8] such as industrial
control systems are examples of such integration where the effects on the physical world
are controlled through the use of smart technologies operated by computers [9]. Air
transportation systems and airplanes are major CPS instantiations, and safety and security
are central requirements for enabling high confidence CPS [10].
Recent FAA regulations indicate that tight cyber-physical integrations, within air-
craft and between aircraft and offboard systems, warrant a surgical consideration of cyber-
physical interactions and potential performance risks from cyber and physical threats [4].
Hence, this paper proposes information flow security analysis of CPS for a foundational
understanding of information flow paths, risks and performance of air traffic surveillance
system’s cyber-physical integrations.
21.1. CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) is an emerging vision for next-generation information
systems that boldly transform the way modern society perceives the physical world, lives,
moves, interacts in it, and systems on which human safety and public well being rests.
CPS represent a new generation of systems that integrate computing and communication
capabilities with the dynamics of physical and engineered systems.
CPS are susceptible to vulnerabilities such as defects in the platform, misconfig-
uration of the system, improper network connections and malware. Attackers can take
advantage of vulnerabilities in CPS to take control of the system. With physical manifesta-
tions in the real world, attacks on CPS can cause disruption to physical services or create
a national disaster. As a CPS requires a tight coupling between the physical and cyber
controlling components, it is crucial to ensure that the system is secure for all the cyber and
physical processes. Therefore, protecting the CPS against cyber attacks is of paramount
importance [8].
Traditional security methods can be applied to protect a CPS, such as a critical
infrastructure system, against cyber threats or threats imposed by malicious insiders and
attackers. However, due to the unique characteristics and complexity of a CPS, traditional
security models and approaches are insufficient to address the security challenges of a CPS
[11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. For example, installing security patches or numerous system
updates that require taking the system offline is difficult, not economically justifiable, and
often infeasible. Also, new updates or security patches may create other problems such as
in a case where a nuclear power plant accidentally was shutdown after a software update
[17].
Information flow security in a CPS can lead to particularly complex security par-
titions i.e more than just high and low. Tools that work well with securing the cyber part
of the system rarely work well to keep the physically observable parts of the system from
leaking information. Physically locking the fence around the physical parts of the CPS
3does not protect from a purely cyber attack. Typical electronic or cryptographic solutions
do not match specific cases closely enough to handle the cyber-physical interfaces as they
are mainly focused on cyber threat prevention and protection. A persistent attacker with
enough time and backing will get in.
A recent, comprehensive survey [18] includes 147 references to publications related
to information-flow security. The bulk of these papers are concerned with defining and
refining variations on noninterference, the fundamental information-flow property that es-
sentially requires that secret information not affect publicly observable behavior of a system.
Many of the remaining papers describe approaches to enforcing information-flow policies
using program analysis techniques. Yet despite this large body of literature and consider-
able, ongoing attention from the research community, information-flow based enforcement
mechanisms have not been widely used.
The real challenge in information-flow security is not in giving better, more precise
definitions of noninterference and related properties for more complicated combinations of
language features and system models. Nor is the real challenge implementing languages
that support information-flow policies; the programming languages Jif [19], and Flow Caml
[20, 21], provide high-level, realistic programming languages with support for sophisticated
information-flow controls. Although there are certainly interesting open questions in both its
theory and implementation, the real challenge for information-flow security is demonstrating
that all of this theory and these language designs are actually useful - the technology needs
to be applied to real problems, or, failing that, understand why such an appealing technology
is not useful in practice.
This thesis examines the current security models in practice for information-flow
technology and tries to identify some of the main obstacles of putting it into practice. It
also introduces a new information flow security model to minimize the shortcomings of the
traditional models. The developed model is used to analyze various components of avionic
systems and present solutions to mitigate the potential problems.
41.2. NONDEDUCIBILITY AND SECURITY MODELS
Nondeducibility (ND) was introduced by Sutherland [22] as an attempt to use
modal techniques to model data in a partitioned security system. The possible worlds
(e.g., state collections) of this model are partitioned into two disjoint sets and information
is restricted to one side of the partition or the other [23]. Information that could not be
inferred from the other side of the partition was determined to be Nondeducibility secure.
Overlapping security domains break Sutherland’s Nondeducibility as do information flows,
the correctness of the system cannot be evaluated because of the partitions [24].
A modal technique to model complex security domains, Multiple Security Domain
Model Nondeducibility (MSDND) was introduced. MSDND can model any system where
Sutherland Nondeducibility holds and complex systems where Nondeducibility cannot be
determined. MSDND models CPS well, even when the security domains overlap or the
boundaries are not ideal and leak [24]. Modal logic based models work well for systems
having valuation functions for the states but the complex cyber-physical systems leak in-
formation because the interactions between physical parts of the system can be watched
for changes. By their very nature, CPS are messy from a security domain view point.
Domains overlap, the boundaries are not clean (ideal boundaries cannot leak information),
and outside threats can leak into domains thought to be secure [24].
Computer security tools work best when secure domains are cleanly nested inside
less secure domains like a medieval castle with its outer walls and interior keep. This model
serves us well for most uses, but breaks down when applied to CPS. Because CPS typically
need to secure both data and information flow, the security domain picture gets complicated.
There is a need for tools that can model the cyber and physical components of CPS.
51.3. PROVERIF
In recent years, research has strongly shifted from manual proofs to automated
proofs of security. The verification step to ensure that a computer program, a protocol or a
CPS has certain requested properties is a crucial one, and this task should ideally be done by
formal reasoning, rather than by tests and simulations. There are two possible approaches
to protocol verification: the formal model and the computational model. The first model
is in a highly idealized setting and it can be effectively implemented using fully-automated
protocol verifiers. The second approach borrows ideas from complexity theory and requires
much more human intervention in proofs, and it is only recently being automated [25].
These verification techniques allow us to uncover design faults that may remain hidden for
years. In this thesis, Bruno Blanchet’s ProVerif [26, 27, 28] automates the MSDND process
and verifies the correctness of the system with the help of proofs.
ProVerif is a tool for automatically analyzing the security of cryptographic pro-
tocols. Support is provided for, but not limited to, cryptographic primitives including:
symmetric and asymmetric encryption; digital signatures; hash functions; bit-commitment;
and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. ProVerif is capable of proving reachability
properties, correspondence assertions, and observational equivalence. These capabilities
are particularly useful to the computer security domain since they permit the analysis of
secrecy and authentication properties. Moreover, emerging properties such as privacy,
traceability, and verifiability can also be considered. Protocol analysis is considered with
respect to an unbounded number of sessions and an unbounded message space. The tool is
also capable of attack reconstruction: when a property cannot be proved, ProVerif tries to
reconstruct an execution trace that falsifies the desired property.
The primary goal of ProVerif is the verification of cryptographic protocols. Cryp-
tographic protocols are concurrent programs which interact using public communication
channels such as the Internet to achieve some security-related objective. These channels are
assumed to be controlled by a very powerful environment which captures an attacker with
6"Dolev-Yao" capabilities. A second class of models is used by the community of formal
methods, and includes typically the Dolev-Yao model [29] and the Spi-calculus [30]. By
focusing on the protocol layer, these models aim to account for a variety of attacks resulting
from complex interactions between an active attacker and a possibly unbounded number of
parallel sessions. Since the attacker has complete control of the communication channels,
the attacker may: read, modify, delete, and inject messages. The attacker is also able to
manipulate data, for example: compute the ith element of a tuple; and decrypt messages
if it has the necessary keys. The environment also captures the behavior of dishonest
participants; it follows that only honest participants need to be modeled [31]. ProVerif’s
input language allows such cryptographic protocols and associated security objectives to
be encoded in a formal manner, allowing ProVerif to automatically verify claimed secu-
rity properties. Cryptography is assumed to be perfect; that is, the attacker is only able
to perform cryptographic operations when in possession of the required keys. In other
words, it cannot apply any polynomial-time algorithm, but is restricted to apply only the
cryptographic primitives specified by the user. The relationships between cryptographic
primitives are captured using rewrite rules and/or an equational theory.
In this thesis, the deducibility of information flow is verified both manually and
using a tool with respect to individual entities to show evidence of possible attacks. This
thesis uses a combination of statecharts and modal logic to model complex CPS systems
which accept commands from multiple sources. Both statecharts and MSDND are used to
analyse the information flow paths in a Traffic Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS) and
a Automatic Dependent Broadcast - Surveillance (ADS-B) System. This model is extended
to identify the problems and provide feasible solutions in reference to various other avionic
systems. It also provides a practical understanding of how cyber security impacts airplane
functions, in the presence of existing safety, development, and training requirements and
processes. In addition to this, ProVerif is used to automate the MSDND process for the air
traffic surveillance systems using observational equivalence and integrity properties.
7The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
introduction about the attacker model and the various avionics systems used to model
MSDND. Section 3 motivates the need for cyber physical security of air traffic surveillance
systems. Section 4 presents a brief survey about the contributions made to devise security
proofs for ensuring safety and security for the avionic systems and the associated challenges.
Section 5 proposes an approach for modeling the air traffic surveillance systems usingmodal
logic. Section 6 providesMSDND proofs for various attack scenarios and the ProVerif code
associated with each scenario is present in the Appendices. Section 7 provides possible
future work. Section 8 presents conclusions.
82. SYSTEMMODEL
Theworld of air traffic control (ATC) ismoving from uncooperative and independent
(primary surveillance radar, PSR) to cooperative and dependent air traffic surveillance
(secondary surveillance radar, SSR). This paradigm shift holds the promise of reducing the
total cost of deployment and improving the detection accuracy of aircraft.
2.1. ADVERSARY AND ATTACKMODEL
The adversary in this model can send fake data by taking control of the aircraft,
cause a malfunction in one of the aircraft components, include manual errors by the pilot
and include environmental factors while being unnoticed rather than to disable and disrupt
the entire aircraft. Therefore, reconnaissance to know about the system’s operation becomes
important as attack attempts are considered. The failure in implementing the attack can
more easily be detected due to the deterministic and predictable nature of the system.
This thesis assumes that the adversary has an understanding about the air traffic
surveillance systems and has knowledge of the system functions. For example, an attacker
may obtain control over the aircraft cabin by hijacking the plane and compromising one of
the systems. These assumptions are not unreasonable as demonstrated by Stuxnet [32], a
multi-stage attack in which the attackers compromised many other systems before reaching
their target system, and in which the attackers stayed undetected for months conducting
reconnaissance on the target system before they launched their attacks.
92.2. TRAFFIC COLLISION AND AVOIDANCE SYSTEM (TCAS)
TCAS was designed to operate in traffic densities of up to 0.3 aircraft per square
nautical mile (nmi); i.e., 24 aircraft within a 5 nmi radius, which was the highest traffic
density envisioned over the next 20 years. The main functions of TCAS are to identify
a potential collision threat, communicate the detected threat to the pilot, and assist in the
resolution of the threat by recommending an avoidance maneuver. This is applied if an
air traffic controller (ATC) fails to maintain separation via clearances. The TCAS is a
beacon-based airborne collision avoidance system that is able to operate in all airspace
without reliance on ground equipment. Figure 2.1 presents how the TCAS interacts with
in-flight and ground equipment.
A TCAS installation can conceptually be divided into two subsystems: surveillance
and control logic. TCAS works by one aircraft interrogating other aircraft transponders.
This way, each TCAS equipped aircraft can locate nearby transponder equipped aircraft,
and potential collisions can be detected. Surveillance of the air traffic environment is
based on air-to-air interrogations broadcast once per second from antennae on the TCAS
aircraft using the same frequency (1030 MHz). Transponders on nearby intruder aircraft
receive these interrogations and send replies at 1090 MHz. Two types of transponders are
currently in use: Mode-C transponders, which do not have unique addressing capability,
andMode-S transponders, which have a unique 24 bit identifier. To trackMode-C intruders,
TCAS transmits "Mode-A, C-only all call" interrogations once per second. All Mode-A,
C equipped aircraft in a region around the TCAS aircraft reply. TCAS sends interrogators
using a four-beam directional antenna with 90 degree beams. In contrast, Mode-S equipped
intruders are tracked with a selective interrogation once per second directed at that specific
intruder by listening the squitter. Note that Mode-S transponders send out spontaneous
signals known as 56-bit squitters. All aircraft with TCAS are equipped with Mode-S
transponders. The TCAS concept makes use of the radar beacon transponders installed on
aircraft to operate with ATC’s ground-based radars. The level of protection provided by
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TCAS equipment depends on the type of transponder the target aircraft is carrying. It should
be noted that TCAS provides no protection against aircraft that do not have an operating
transponder. Figure 2.2 presents the communication between two aircraft using TCAS.
Without reliance on ground equipment, TCAS is capable of providing resolution
advisories in the vertical dimension (climb, descend) in airspace. TCAS interacts with
the following components: Radio Altimeter, A/C Discretes, Receiver, Transmitter, Mode-S
Transponder and other flight control units [33]. TCAS issues two types of alerts:
• Traffic Advisories (TAs) to assist the pilot in the visual search for the intruder aircraft
and to prepare the pilot for a potential resolution advisory.
• Resolution Advisories (RAs) to recommend maneuvers that will either increase or
maintain the existing vertical separation from an intruder aircraft. When the intruder
aircraft is also fitted with TCAS, both TCAS systems co-ordinate their RAs through
the Mode S data link to ensure that complementary RAs are selected. If the intruder
aircraft is equipped with Mode A transponder only, TCAS provides just the TA. If
the intruder aircraft is equipped with Mode C or Mode S transponder only, TCAS
provides TA and RA to the pilot.
2.3. AUTOMATIC DEPENDENT SURVEILLANCE BROADCAST (ADS-B)
ADS-B is a replacement for (or supplement to) traditional radar based surveillance of
aircraft. ADS-B uses satellite-based navigation systems to determine an aircraft’s precise
location in space. The system then converts the position into a digital code, which is
combined with other information such as the type of aircraft, flight number, speed, and
intent. An ADS-B equipped aircraft broadcasts its information through an omnidirectional
fashion, and any aircraft or ATC facility can receive this information (See Figure 2.3). These
broadcasts are not in response to interrogations, unlike existing transponder technology.
ADS-B transmission occurs at much lower rate than SSR replies. Note that ADS-B cannot
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Figure 2.1. TCAS II Interacting Entities
replace existing SSRs until all aircraft are equipped with ADS-B equipment to broadcast
state vector information. ADS-B will most likely be mandated in airspace where Mode-C
transponders are currently required [34].
2.4. PITOT STATIC SYSTEM
A pitot-static system is a system of pressure-sensitive instruments that is most often
used in aviation to determine an aircraft’s airspeed, Mach number, altitude, and altitude
trend (See Figure 2.4). A pitot-static system generally consists of a pitot tube, a static
port, and the pitot-static instruments [35]. This equipment is used to measure the forces
acting on a vehicle as a function of the temperature, density, pressure and viscosity of
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Figure 2.2. Communication Between Two TCAS Equipped Aircrafts
the fluid in which it is operating. Other instruments that might be connected are air data
computers, flight data recorders, altitude encoders, cabin pressurization controllers, and
various airspeed switches [36].
Managing a static system malfunction requires that the pilot know and understand
the airplane’s pitot-static system. If a system malfunction is suspected, the pilot should
confirm it by opening the alternate static source. It is a source of ambient air pressure from
the depressurized area within an aircraft for use when the static vent malfunctions. It is
less accurate, but usable in emergency situations. This should be done while the airplane is
climbing or descending.
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Figure 2.3. ADS-B System
2.5. LIFT RESERVE INDICATOR (LRI)
An LRI is a system used to measure the amount of lift being produced by a wing
in any given situation, by comparing the static pressure to the dynamic pressure in a probe
mounted in a fixed position under the wing. It is used to maintain a safe margin from a
stalling condition, and used in takeoff, landing, and while maneuvering at any attitude or
angle. When displayed on a simple pressure differential gauge with a modified face, the
pilot knows the amount of lift reserve available at any given moment [37].
The LRI integrates both airspeed and angle of attack in a single readout reliably and
continuously displaying an aircraft’s margin over stall despite the wide range of variables
to which an aircraft is subject. This helps the pilot to maintain proper course in case of
incorrect airspeed readings.
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Figure 2.4. Pitot Static System [1]
2.6. INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM (INS)
An INS is a totally self-contained dead reckoning system [38]. Dead reckoning is
the process of calculating current position of the aircraft by using a previously determined
position, or fix, and advancing that position based upon known or estimated speeds over
elapsed time and course. Given its starting position, INS keeps track of all movements in
all directions so it calculates the aircraft’s flight position in relation to that point. To detect
movement, the INS uses three accelerometers: one north-south, one east-west, and one
up-down mounted on a stable platform. The platform is stabilized using three gyros, one
each for pitch, yaw and roll. This way the aircraft’s movement is constantly monitored and
helps the pilot keep the aircraft on course.
Advanced INS use ring laser gyros that are made up of a series of lasers aligned
in the same plane and forming a ring. Interference patterns are generated as the aircraft
accelerates indicating changes in the airplane’s movement.
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The INS must be initialized on the ramp prior to takeoff. The pilot merely enters
the aircraft’s coordinates and the system performs the calculations since it has an internal
clock calendar. This system computes track, drift angle, cross track error, distance traveled,
distance remaining and flight time remaining for the pilot.
The INS system uses a multitude of invariant data such as measurements provided
by accelerometers and gyroscopes to track the position and orientation of an object relative
to a known starting point, orientation and velocity.
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3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Aviation security is at the forefront of society, mostly as a protection against terror-
ism and national security threats in the physical world. The introduction of cyber advances
and tight cyber-physical integration within aircraft, however, raises new aviation security
considerations for threats from and to cyberspace. Cyberspace has well-known vulnerabil-
ities to physical world exploits such as radio jamming and equipment compromise. The
growth of future aviation, hence, heavily weighs on understanding cyber-physical threats
to aircraft, identifying new threats from cyber-physical integration, and managing security
risks. Factors contributing to risk include system malfunction, intruders, mistakes by the
pilots and environmental factors.
The challenges continue to grow as individual systems evolve, operate with greater
autonomy and intelligence, and operate as part of a networked system of systems. A more
concise way to classify cyber and physical assets in aviation and the information flow paths
between these assets, which must be protected against threats and from becoming a threat
is needed. Additionally, a more formal way of representing various attacks and possible
mitigation measures is needed in order to ensure security of the entire system.
Air-to-air, air-to-ground, and satellite-to-air communications were considered to
perform security analysis either from the cyber point of view or the physical point of view.
Certainly a formal method is required to perform security analysis considering the cyber-
physical interactions, looking for the potential risks and changes that have been occurring
in airplane systems, along with the implications of those changes.
This thesis is aimed at addressing the above specified issues by focusing on cyber
and physically enabled attacks by using a model-based approach to identify security risks
and provide mitigation measures.
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4. RELATEDWORK
This work mainly focuses on nondeducibility in multiple security domains involving
commands from multiple sources and applies to cyber physical systems involving complex
interactions between different states of the system.
It is well known in the aviation community that the ATC system, which is currently
being rolled out, called automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B), had not been
developed with security in mind and is susceptible to a number of different radio frequency
(RF) attacks. The problem has recently been widely reported in the press [39, 40, 41, 42]
and at hacker conventions [43, 44, 45]. Academic researchers, too, proved the ease of
compromising the security of ADS-B with current off-the-shelf hard- and software [46].
This broad news exposure led the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to put
the security of civil aviation on the agenda of the 12th air navigation conference, identifying
"cyber security as a high level impediment to implementation that should be considered as
part of the roadmap development process" and creating a task force to help with the future
coordination of the efforts of involved stakeholders.
Similar work has been carried out in [24] but this work is limited to accepting
commands from a single source and it does not cover all the possible state transitions in the
system. Similar work has been carried out in [47] which usedMSDND tomodel the security
of a chemical plant using BIT logic. The major drawback is the inability to represent the
state transitions and interactions in a concise way and our work covers this by segregating
the system into multiple security domains. These security domains contains multiple states
and the security issues between the state interactions are considered.
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5. MULTIPLE SECURITY DOMAIN NONDEDUCIBILITY
5.1. MODAL LOGIC MODEL
Formally, a set of worlds W are defined, consisting of distinct worlds, w0,w1,...,wn
where, if m state variables are present, S1,S2,...,Sm then it is possible to have 2m distinct
worlds.
The worlds are connected by a set of transitions, {wRw′}. Changing any state
variable causes a transition from the current world, w, to another world, w′ where all other
state variables retain their values. Together, the set of worlds and transitions define a frame,
F = {W,R}.
A set of valuation functions are defined, {V}, such that V isx (w) returns the value of
state variable sx as seen by an entity i in world w. NOTE: If no valuation function exists to
return the value of a state variable, say si, then the model can never determine the value of
that state variable nor the value of any logical expression dependent upon that state variable.
By combining the valuation functions and the frame, the model can be defined asM= {F,V}
or M = {W,R,V} [24].
5.2. MULTIPLE SECURITY DOMAIN NONDEDUCIBILITY MODEL
Extending existingmodels tomultiple security domains is problematic. An extended
version of theMultiple Security Domains NondeducibilityModel using statecharts and local
invariants present in the CPS was proposed in this thesis. An entity i is defined as any part
of the system capable of independent observation or action.
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The Event System (ES) can be divided into multiple security domains, SDi, as
viewed by each entity i in the model. These domains may, or may not, overlap with each
other. These multiple security domains conform to the following rules:
∪i∈ISDi = (ES) (5.1)
5.3. DEFINITION: MULTIPLE SECURITY DOMAIN EXCLUSIVITY
There exists some world with multiple states in which at any instance the system
can be in one true state and the others are false.
f (Sa, Sb, Sc, .....) =

where exactly one of Sa, Sb, Sc, ... is True
otherwise False
(5.2)
5.4. DEFINITION: MULTIPLE SECURITY DOMAIN NONDEDUCIBILITY
There exists some world with multiple states in which at any instance one state is
true and the others are false, but an entity i has no valuation function for those states. In
security domain SDi, the states cannot be evaluated to either true or false.
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : w ` [ f (Sa, Sb, Sc, .....)]
∧[w |= (V iSa(w) ∧ V iSb (w) ∧ V iSc (w)......)]
(5.3)
Note: There exists a valuation function if all the state variables return true and there
does not exist a valuation function if any of the state variables returns false.
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5.5. LOCAL INVARIANTS
An invariant is a quantity that remains unchanged under certain classes of transfor-
mations. Invariants are extremely useful for classifying mathematical objects because they
usually reflect intrinsic properties of the object of study. Local invariants are the invariants
between any pair of attributes of the system.
5.6. DEFINITION: DF FUNCTION
In the axiomatic view, df tests whether an event variable has a defined value [48].
This function contains series of transitions which results in an output
df _ : P(eventX) (5.4)
For example, a label expression which requires a signal a and generates a signal b
in the next step is written as df a/df b′.
Note: df is different from valuation function which returns the value of a state
variable seen by an entity.
5.7. PROVERIF WITH RESPECT TOMSDND
ProVerif is capable of proving reachability properties, correspondence assertions,
and observational equivalence. In this thesis, reachability property and observational
equivalence are used to prove deducibility.
5.7.1. Reachability Property. Given a system and a property p, reachability model
checking is based on an exhaustive exploration of the reachable state space of the system,
testing whether there exists a state where p holds. The main obstacle to this approach is the
state-explosion problem reflecting the fact that the system’s state space is often prohibitively
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large to be entirely explored. Abstractions have been proven a useful tool in coping with
state explosion. Model checking using abstractions consists of exploring a abstract state
space rather than the concrete one.
This thesis abstracts the collision region of the TCAS and ADS-B systems into a 9-
grid system inwhich each grid cell is considered to be of same size. Each grid cell is denoted
as XY_Coord_Node_x where x ∈ {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}. If both planes are in different grid
cells, they are equidistant from each other. For e.g., if the plane-1 is in XY_Coord_Node_1
and plane-2 is in XY_Coord_Node_9, they are equidistant from each other (See Figure 5.1).
If both planes are in the same grid cell, collision is bound to happen. If they are in different
grid cells, the pilots can follow the RAs suggested by the TCAS system and avoid collision.
ProVerif attempts to prove that a state in which the nodes are known to the adversary is
unreachable (that is, it tests the query not attacker(XY_Coord), and this query is true when
the location is not derivable by the adversary). This makes ProVerif suitable for proving
the secrecy of data with respect to MSDND.
If ProVerif’s output is of the form RESULT not attacker:(XY_Coord[]) is true, the
attacker has not been able to obtain the location XY_Coord. The attacker has, however, been
able to obtain the locationXY_Coord as denoted by theRESULTnot attacker:(XY_Coord[])
is false. It follows that when ProVerif is supplied with query attacker(M)., internally
ProVerif attempts to show not attacker(M) and hence RESULT not attacker(M) is true.
means that the secrecy of M is preserved by the protocol.
5.7.2. Observational Equivalence. The MSDND model uses the most general
class of equivalences P ≈ Q where the processes P and Q have the same structure and
differ only in the choice of terms. These equivalences are written in ProVerif by a single
"biprocess" that encodes both P and Q. Such a biprocess uses the construct choice[M,M’]
to represent the terms that differ between P and Q: P uses the first component of the
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Figure 5.1. 9-Grid System
choice, M, while Q uses the second one, M’. The MSDND model uses a similar approach
to identify whether a state is false or true, considering parallel composition of different
security domains.
In order to correctly understand the results of the observational equivalence property
in ProVerif, it is important to understand the difference between the attack derivation and
the attack trace. The attack derivation is an explanation of the actions that the attacker has
to execute in order to break the security property, in the internal representation of ProVerif.
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Because this internal representation uses abstractions, the derivation is not always
executable in reality; for instance, it may require the repetition of certain actions that can in
fact never be repeated, for instance because they are not under a replication. In contrast, the
attack trace refers to the semantics of the applied pi calculus, and always corresponds to an
executable trace of the considered process. ProVerif can display three kinds of results:
• RESULT [Query] is true: The query is proved, there is no attack. In this case,
ProVerif displays no attack derivation and no attack trace.
• RESULT [Query] is false: The query is false, ProVerif has discovered an attack
against the desired security property.
• RESULT [Query] cannot be proved: This is a "don’t know" answer. ProVerif could
not prove that the query is true and also could not find an attack that proves that the
query is false. Since the problem of verifying protocols for an unbounded number
of sessions is undecidable, this situation is unavoidable. Still, ProVerif gives some
additional information that can be useful in order to determine whether the query is
true. In particular, ProVerif displays an attack derivation. By manually inspecting
the derivation, it is sometimes possible to reconstruct an attack. For observational
equivalence properties, it may also display an attack trace, even if this trace does not
prove that the observational equivalence does not hold.
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6. MODAL LOGIC WITH THE USE OF INVARIANTS
This section presents an overview of the vulnerabilities associated with air traffic
surveillance systems. In order to do this, the scenarios are divided into two parts: 1)
identifying the compromised system or a malfunctioning system. 2) using the invariants
associated with air traffic surveillance systems and applying those invariants to theMSDND
model which helps in identifying the vulnerabilities associated with the system.
6.1. RADAR TRANSPONDER FAILURE
This section presents two different scenarios to check if the compromised radar
transponder can be identified by the pilot.
6.1.1. Scenario 1: Without Invariants. In case of a failure in the radar transpon-
der, the MSDND model yields Nondeducibility, thereby stopping critical information flow
to the pilot and the ATC controller.
Proof: Let us consider the possibility of failure in the radar transponder of the
aircraft (See Figure 6.1). The ATC controller receives incorrect information about the
aircraft identification. This could lead to improper communication between the ATC
controller and the pilot. The controller and the pilot cannot distinguish the source of
incorrect information.
Table 6.1 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p, c, t, r, x that can be evaluated
to determine the interactions between the aircraft and the ATC.
Once the flight information is retrieved, the ATC controller and the pilot can observe
that there is a mismatch between the flight data and ATC data. The ATC controller and the
pilot cannot distinguish whether there is a failure in the aircraft transponder or the radar
system of ATC. The pilot can sense the position of the aircraft from the altitude reading,
but cannot evaluate the source of incorrect information being sent to the ATC and TCAS.
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Table 6.1. Radar Transponder Logical Conditions And States - Without Invariants
ϕi States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 Interrogations Initiation of transmission of interrogations from
ATC.
ϕ2 Replies Initiation of transmission of replies from XPDR.
ϕ3 TCAS Data TCAS System knows the position of the plane.
ϕ4 Radar Data ATCRadar System knows the location of the plane.
ϕ5 Communication Initiation of communication between pilot and con-
troller based on TCASData and Radar Data respec-
tively.
Sp p = T p = ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5
∼df(TCAS data) ∧ ∼df(communication)
Output = TA or RA
Sc c = T c = ¬ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ5
∼df(Radar) ∧ ∼df(communication)
Output = Flight Location
St t = T t = ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ3
∼df(replies) ∧ ∼df(TCAS data)
Output = Position
Sr r = T r = ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4
df(interrogations)∧∼df(replies)∧∼df(Radar data)
Output = Display
Sx x = T x = ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2
df(interrogations) ∧ ∼df(replies)
The two security domains in this scenario are SDP {pilot domain} and SDC {ATC
controller domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDP and SDC ,
Sp = ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ⇒ VP∼t (6.1)
Since the information received from the pilot domain is faulty, the pilot cannot
valuate for correctness of the TCAS data in that domain.
Sc = ¬ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ⇒ VCt (6.2)
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Since the information received from the pilot domain is faulty, the ATC controller
cannot valuate for correctness of the TCAS data in that domain.
By combining Equation 6.1 and Equation 6.2,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (Sp, Sc)] ∧ [w |= (VP∼t ∧ VCt ] (6.3)
Figure 6.1. Faulty Radar Transponder
Therefore, from physical observation the ATC controller can deduce that something
is going wrong but cannot deduce the source that is sending incorrect information to the
TCAS and ATC radar.
Hence, the system is Nondeducible secure to the pilot and the ATC controller as
they can deduce that something is going wrong, but cannot deduce the entity responsible
for transmitting incorrect data.
6.1.2. Scenario 2: Using Invariants. In case of radar transponder compromise,
the MSDND model yields deducibility, thereby allowing critical information flow to the
pilot and the ATC controller.
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Proof: The above mentioned scenario can be made deducible to the pilot and ATC
controller by relying on alternate information flow path from INS, which helps in identifying
the compromised system (See Figure 6.2). Hence, the pilot and the ATC controller can
deduce the source of incorrect information based on the invariant data computed by INS.
In case of failure in the radar transponder, the pilot can make use of the INS system.
The velocity is calculated using
v = v0 + at (6.4)
where, v0 is the initial velocity, v is the final velocity, a is the acceleration and t is
the time between observations.
Using the final velocity from Equation 6.4, the distance travelled by the aircraft can
be calculated using
d = v ∗ t (6.5)
where, d is the distance travelled, v is the velocity and t is the time.
Note: In Table 6.2, d is the distance travelled by the plane projected on the INS
system.
Table 6.2 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p, c, t, r, x, i that can be evaluated
to determine the interactions between the aircraft and the ATC. The two security domains in
this scenario are SDT {TCAS domain} and SDI {INS domain}. By combining the valuation
functions in SDT and SDI with respect to invariants from Equation 6.4 and Equation 6.5 in
the pilot’s domain,
St = ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ3 ⇒ VP∼i (6.6)
Since the information received from the pilot domain is faulty, the pilot cannot
valuate for correctness of the TCAS data in that domain.
Si = ϕ6 ∧ ϕ7 ⇒ VPi (6.7)
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Table 6.2. Radar Transponder Logical Conditions And States - Using Invariants
ϕi States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 Interrogations Initiation of transmission of interrogations from
ATC.
ϕ2 Replies Initiation of transmission of replies from XPDR.
ϕ3 TCAS Data TCAS System knows the position of the plane.
ϕ4 Radar Data ATCRadar System knows the location of the plane.
ϕ5 Communication Correct communication between pilot and con-
troller based on TCAS Data and Radar Data re-
spectively.
ϕ6 d Pilot checks the position of the plane using INS and
verifies it with the TCAS data.
ϕ7 Verification Pilot and the controller checks and verifies the po-
sition of the respective aircraft and verifies it with
the position data displayed.
Sp p = T p = ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ϕ6 ∧ ϕ7
∼df(TCAS data) ∧ ∼df(communication) ∧ df(d) ∧
df(Verification)
Output = TA or RA
Sc c = T c = ¬ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ϕ7
∼df(Radar) ∧ ∼df(communication) ∧
df(Verification)
Output = Flight Location
St t = T t = ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ3
∼df(replies) ∧ ∼df(TCAS data)
Output = Position
Sr r = T r = ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4
df(interrogations)∧∼df(replies)∧∼df(Radar data)
Output = Display
Sx x = T x = ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2
df(interrogations) ∧ ∼df(replies)
Si i = T i = ϕ6 ∧ ϕ7
df(d) ∧ ∼df(Verification)
Since the information received from the pilot domain is faulty, the ATC controller
cannot valuate for correctness of the TCAS data in that domain.
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By combining Equation 6.6 and Equation 6.7,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (St, Si)] ∧ [w |= (VP∼i ∧ ∃VPi ] (6.8)
Figure 6.2. INS Helps Identify The Faulty Radar Transponder
Hence, the system is not Nondeducible secure to the pilot and the ATC controller as
they can deduce that TCAS system is responsible for transmitting incorrect data.
The ProVerif code in APPENDIX A proves that this attack is not Nondeducible
secure when INS is used as an alternate information flow path. As can be interpreted from
"RESULT not attacker(XY_Coord[]) is false", the TCAS process is compromised.
6.2. RADAR TRANSPONDER FAILURE AND TCAS
This section presents two different scenarios to check if the compromised radar
transponder can be identified by the pilot using TCAS.
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6.2.1. Scenario 1: Without Using Invariants. In case of radar transponder com-
promise of plane-1, the MSDND model yields Nondeducibility, thereby stopping critical
information flow to the pilots and the ATC Controller.
Proof: It is a known fact that most of the world is not covered by radar. Part of that
is a technical challenge. The air traffic system runs on ground-based radar, and most of the
world is covered in water. Ground stations are not available in the ocean. For that reason,
once the flight is more than a few miles off the coast, it is going to be out of radar range and
this is called no-radar zone.
In this case, the ATC controller cannot receive information about the aircraft’s
identification. This could lead to miscommunication between both the pilots in case of any
failure. Let us consider the possibility of malfunction of the TCAS-1 system. This leads to
the display of incorrect data on the TCAS system and the pilots cannot distinguish which
TCAS system is faulty. But the controller cannot identify the plane with a faulty TCAS
system from the radar data and cannot provide necessary maneuvers to avoid collision by
directing the pilots in correct directions (See Figure 6.3).
Table 6.3 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p1, p2, c, t1, t2, r that can be
evaluated to determine the interactions between the planes and the ATC.
In case the plane is in a no-radar zone, once the flight information is retrieved, pilots
communicate with each other in case of close proximity to avoid collision. If the TCAS
system of pilot-1 presents wrong information due to technical failure, the pilots cannot
distinguish which plane is presenting wrong information.
The two security domains in this scenario are SDP {pilot domain} and SDC {ATC
controller domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDP and SDC ,
Sp = ¬ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ⇒ VP∼t (6.9)
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Table 6.3. Radar And TCAS Logical Conditions And States - Without Invariants
ϕi States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 Interrogations Correct transmission of interrogations from ATC.
ϕ2 Reply-1 Correct transmission of replies from XPDR-1.
ϕ3 Reply-2 Correct transmission of replies from XPDR-2.
ϕ4 TCAS-1 Data TCAS-1 knows the position of the plane-1 and plane-2.
ϕ5 TCAS-2 Data TCAS-2 knows the position of the plane-1 and plane-2.
ϕ6 Radar Data ATC Radar System knows the location of the plane-1 and
plane-2.
ϕ7 Communication Correct communication between pilot-1, pilot-2 and the
Controller from TCAS Data and Radar Data.
Sp1 p1 = T p1 = ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ7
∼df(Reply-1) ∧ ∼df(TCAS-1 data) ∧
∼df(communication)
Output = TA or RA
Sp2 p2 = T p2 = ϕ3 ∧ ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7
df(Reply-2) ∧ df(TCAS-2 data) ∧ ∼df(communication)
Output = TA or RA
Sc c = T c = ¬ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ7
∼df(Reply-1) ∧ df(Reply-2) ∧ ∼df(Radar Data) ∧
∼df(communication)
Output = Flight Location
St1 t1 = T t1 = ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4
∼df(Reply-1) ∧ ∼df(TCAS-1 data)
Output = Position
St2 t2 = T t2 = ϕ3 ∧ ϕ5
df(Reply-2) ∧ df(TCAS-2 data)
Output = Position
Sr r = T r = ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ6
df(Interrogations) ∧ ∼df(Reply-1) ∧ df(Reply-2) ∧
∼df(Radar data)
Output = Display
Since the information received from the pilot’s domain is faulty, the pilots cannot valuate
for correctness of the TCAS data in that domain.
Sc = ¬ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ⇒ ∃VCt (6.10)
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Since the information received from the pilot domain is faulty, the ATC controller
cannot valuate for correctness of the TCAS data in that domain.
By combining Equation 6.9 and Equation 6.10,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (Sp, Sc)] ∧ [w |= (VP∼t ∧ ∃VCt ] (6.11)
Figure 6.3. TCAS And Faulty Radar Transponder
Hence, the system is Nondeducible to the pilots and not Nondeducible to the Con-
troller as he can deduce that something is going wrong and can determine which entity
is responsible for displaying the incorrect data. This situation gives rise to dangerous
situations as the pilots believe in the false data and might result in a collision of the planes.
6.2.2. Scenario 2: Using Invariants. In case of radar transponder compromise of
plane-1, but using INS, the MSDND model yields deducibility, thereby allowing critical
information flow to the pilots and the ATC Controller.
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Proof: The above mentioned scenario can be made deducible to the pilots and ATC
controller by relying on alternate information flow path from INS, which helps in identifying
the compromised system. Hence, the pilot and the ATC controller can deduce the source
of incorrect information based on the invariant data computed by INS (See Figure 6.4).
In case of failure in the radar transponder, the pilot can make use of the INS system.
The velocity is calculated using Equation 6.4.
Using the final velocity, distance travelled by the aircraft is calculated using Equa-
tion 6.5.
Note: In Table 6.4, d is the distance travelled by the plane projected on INS system.
Table 6.4 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p1, p2, c, t1, t2, r, i1, i2 that can be
evaluated to determine the interactions between the planes and the ATC.
The two security domains in this scenario are SDT {TCAS domain} and SDI {INS
domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDT and SDI with respect to invariants
from Equation 6.4 and Equation 6.5 in pilot-1 domain,
St = ¬ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ5 ⇒ VP∼i (6.12)
Since the information received from the TCAS domain is faulty, the pilot cannot valuate for
correctness of the TCAS data in that domain.
Si = ϕ8 ∧ ϕ9 ∧ ϕ10 ⇒ ∃VPi (6.13)
Since the information received from the INS domain is not faulty, the pilot can valuate for
correctness of the TCAS data in that domain.
By combining Equation 6.12 and Equation 6.13,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (St, Si)] ∧ [w |= (VP∼i ∧ ∃VPi ] (6.14)
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Table 6.4. Radar And TCAS Logical Conditions And States - Using Invariants
ϕi States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 Interrogations Correct transmission of interrogations from ATC.
ϕ2 Reply-1 Correct transmission of replies from XPDR-1.
ϕ3 Reply-2 Correct transmission of replies from XPDR-2.
ϕ4 TCAS-1 Data TCAS-1 knows the position of the plane-2.
ϕ5 TCAS-2 Data TCAS-2 knows the position of the plane-1.
ϕ6 Radar Data ATC Radar System knows the location of the plane-1 and
plane-2.
ϕ7 Communication Correct communication between pilot-1, pilot-2 and the
Controller from TCAS Data and Radar Data.
ϕ8 d1 Pilot-1 checks the position of the plane using INS and
verifies it with the TCAS data.
ϕ9 d2 Pilot-2 checks the position of the plane using INS and
verifies it with the TCAS data.
ϕ10 Verification Pilot-1, pilot-2 and the controller checks and verifies the
INS position data with respect to TCAS position data.
Sp1 p1 = T p1 = ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ7
∼df(Reply-1) ∧ ∼df(TCAS-1 data) ∧
∼df(communication)
Output = TA or RA
Sp2 p2 = T p2 = ϕ3 ∧ ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7
df(Reply-2) ∧ df(TCAS-2 data) ∧ ∼df(communication)
Output = TA or RA
Sc c = T c = ¬ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ7
∼df(Reply-1) ∧ df(Reply-2) ∧ ∼df(Radar Data) ∧
∼df(communication)
Output = Flight Location
St1 t1 = T t1 = ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4
∼df(Reply-1) ∧ ∼df(TCAS-1 data)
Output = Position
St2 t2 = T t2 = ϕ3 ∧ ϕ5
df(Reply-2) ∧ df(TCAS-2 data)
Output = Position
Sr r = T r = ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ6
df(Interrogations) ∧ ∼df(Reply-1) ∧ df(Reply-2) ∧
∼df(Radar data)
Output = Display
Si1 i1 = T i1 = ϕ8 ∧ ϕ10
df(d1) ∧ df(Verification)
Si2 i2 = T i2 = ϕ9 ∧ ϕ10
df(d1) ∧ df(Verification)
35
Figure 6.4. ADS-B Helps To Identify The Faulty Radar Transponder
Hence, the system is not Nondeducible secure to the pilots and the ATC controller
as they can deduce that TCAS system is responsible for transmitting incorrect data.
The ProVerif code in APPENDIX B proves that this attack is not Nondeducible
secure when INS is used as an alternate information flow path. As can be interpreted from
"RESULT not attacker(XY_Coord[]) is false", the TCAS-1 process is compromised.
6.3. ALTIMETER FAILURE
This section presents two different scenarios to check if the compromised altimeter
can be identified by the pilot.
6.3.1. Scenario 1: Without Using Invariants. In case of a failure in the altimeter,
the MSDND model yields Nondeducibility, thereby stopping critical information flow to
the pilot.
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Proof: Let us consider the possibility of failure in the altimeter of the aircraft. The
TCAS system shows an incorrect reading about the flight position to the pilot but the ATC
controller receives correct information about the flight. This could lead to miscommunica-
tion between the ATC controller and the pilot, but the controller can distinguish that there
is some problem with the data from the aircraft. Hence, the controller can deduce that
something is going wrong, but cannot distinguish the source of incorrect information (See
Figure 6.5).
Table 6.5 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p, c, a, t, r, x that can be evaluated
to determine the interactions between aircraft and ATC.
Once the flight information is retrieved, the controller and the pilot can observe that
there is a mismatch between the TCAS altitude reading and ATC data. The controller and
the pilot cannot distinguish whether there is a failure in the TCAS system or the altimeter.
The pilot can sense the position of the aircraft due to the cyber-physical nature of the plane,
but cannot evaluate what is causing the incorrect information being sent to the TCAS.
The two security domains in this scenario are SDP {pilot domain} and SDC {ATC
controller domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDP and SDC ,
Sp = ¬ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ⇒ VP∼a (6.15)
Since the information received from the pilot’s domain is faulty, the pilots cannot
valuate for correctness of the TCAS data in that domain.
Sc = ¬ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ⇒ VCa (6.16)
Since the information received from the pilot domain is faulty, the ATC controller
cannot valuate for correctness of the TCAS data in that domain.
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Table 6.5. Altimeter Logical Conditions And States - Without Invariants
ϕi States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 Interrogations Initiation of transmission of interrogations from
ATC.
ϕ2 Replies Initiation of transmission of replies from XPDR.
ϕ3 Altimeter Data Altimeter knows the position of the plane.
ϕ4 TCAS Data TCAS System knows the position of the plane.
ϕ5 Radar Data ATCRadar System knows the location of the plane.
ϕ6 Communication Initiation of communication between pilot and con-
troller from TCAS Data and Radar Data respec-
tively.
Sp p = T p = ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ6
∼df(Altimeter Data) ∧ ∼df(TCAS Data) ∧
∼df(Communication)
Output = TA or RA
Sc c = T c = ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ6
∼df(Radar Data) ∧ ∼df(Communication)
Output = Flight Location
Sa a = T a = ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ6
∼df(Altimeter Data) ∧ ∼df(Communication)
Output = Flight Location
St t = T t = ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ4
∼df(Replies) ∧ ∼df(TCAS data)
Output = Position
Sr r = T r = ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ5
df(Interrogations) ∧ ∼df(Radar data)
Output = Display
Sx x = T x = ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2
df() ∧ ∼df(Replies)
By combining Equation 6.15 and Equation 6.16,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (Sp, Sc)] ∧ [w |= (VP∼a ∧ VCa ] (6.17)
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Figure 6.5. Faulty Altimeter
Therefore, from physical observation the controller can deduce that something is
going wrong, but cannot deduce the source that is sending incorrect information to the
TCAS, Altimeter and ATC radar.
Hence, the system is Nondeducible secure to the ATC controller and the pilot as
they cannot deduce the source which is responsible for transmitting incorrect data.
6.3.2. Scenario 2: Using Invariants. In case of altimeter compromise, but using
INS the MSDND model yields Nondeducibility, thereby allowing critical information flow
to the pilot and the controller.
Proof: The above mentioned scenario can be made deducible to the pilot by relying
on an alternate system; i.e., INS which helps in figuring out the compromised system.
Hence, the pilot can deduce the source of incorrect information based on the invariant data
computed by the INS (See Figure 6.6).
In case of failure in the altimeter, the pilot can make use of the INS system. The
velocity is calculated using Equation 6.4. Using the final velocity, distance travelled by the
aircraft is calculated using Equation 6.5.
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Table 6.6 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p, c, a, t, r, i that can be evaluated
to determine the interactions between the pilot and ATC controller.
Note: In Table 6.6, d is the distance travelled by the plane projected on INS system.
Table 6.6. Altimeter Logical Conditions And States - Using Invariants
ϕi States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 Interrogations Initiation of transmission of interrogations from ATC.
ϕ2 Replies Initiation of transmission of replies from XPDR.
ϕ3 Altimeter Data Altimeter knows the position of the plane.
ϕ4 TCAS Data TCAS System knows the position of the plane.
ϕ5 Radar Data ATC Radar System knows the location of the plane.
ϕ6 Communication Initiation of communication between pilot and con-
troller from TCAS Data and Radar Data respectively.
ϕ7 d Pilot checks the position of the plane using INS and
verifies it with the TCAS data.
ϕ8 Verification Pilot and the controller checks and verifies the INS
position data with respect to TCAS position data.
Sp p = T p = ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ6 ∧ ϕ7 ∧ ϕ8
∼df(Altimeter Data) ∧ ∼df(TCAS Data) ∧
∼df(Communication) ∧ df(d) ∧ df(Verification)
Output = TA or RA
Sc c = T c = ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ6 ∧ ϕ8
∼df(Radar Data) ∧ ∼df(Communication)
Output = Flight Location
Sa a = T a = ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ6
∼df(Altimeter Data) ∧ ∼df(Communication)
Output = Flight Location
St t = T t = ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ4
∼df(Replies) ∧ ∼df(TCAS data)
Output = Position
Sr r = T r = ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ5
df(Interrogations) ∧ ∼df(Radar data)
Output = Display
Si i = T i = ϕ7 ∧ ϕ8
df(d) ∧ df(Verification)
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The two security domains in this scenario are SDA {Altimeter Domain} and SDI
{INS Domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDA and SDI with respect to
invariants from Equation 6.4 and Equation 6.5 in pilot’s domain,
Sa = ¬ϕ5 ∧ ϕ6 ∧ ϕ8 ⇒ VP∼i (6.18)
Since the information received from the altimeter domain is faulty, the pilot cannot valuate
for correctness of the position data in that domain.
Si = ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ6 ∧ ϕ7 ∧ ϕ8 ⇒ ∃VPi (6.19)
Using the invariants, the information received from INS domain is not faulty and the pilot
can valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
By combining Equation 6.18 and Equation 6.19,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (sa, si)] ∧ [w |= (VP∼i ∧ ∃VPi ] (6.20)
Hence, the system is not Nondeducible secure to the pilot and the controller as they
can deduce that altimeter is presenting incorrect information.
The ProVerif code in APPENDIX C proves that this attack is not Nondeducible
secure when INS is used as an alternate information flow path. As can be interpreted from
"RESULT not attacker(Accept[]) is false", the altimeter process is compromised.
6.4. PITOT STATIC SYSTEM FAILURE
This section presents two different scenarios to check if the compromised pitot static
system can be identified by the pilot.
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Figure 6.6. INS Helps To Identify The Faulty Altimeter
6.4.1. Scenario 1: Without Invariants. In case of a pitot static system compro-
mise, theMSDNDmodel yields Nondeducibility, thereby stopping critical information flow
to the pilot.
Proof: Let us consider the possibility of failure in the altimeter of the pitot static
system. Errors in pitot-static system altimeter readings can be extremely dangerous as the
information obtained from the pitot static system, such as altitude, is potentially safety-
critical. Several commercial airline disasters have been traced to a failure of the pitot-static
system (See Figure 6.7).
Table 6.7 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p, t, ps that can be evaluated to
determine the interactions between the pilot and ATC controller.
Consider the scenario in which the air data computer presents a discrepancy in
the readings of the air speed. Airspeed is probably the most important single piece of
information the pilot needs. Virtually every phase of flight is conducted at a prescribed
airspeed or range of airspeeds.
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Table 6.7. Pitot Static System Logical Conditions And States - Without Invariants
ϕi States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 Invariant Data Initiation of transmission of pressure, speed, altitude and
temperature from the sensors.
ϕ2 Altimeter Data Initiation of transmission of altitude reading to the TCAS
system.
ϕ3 Airspeed Data Initiation of transmission of airspeed data to the pitot system.
ϕ4 TCAS Data TCAS System knows the position of the plane and the alti-
tude data.
ϕ5 Pitot Data Pilot could see the air speed, altitude readings on the Pitot
static system.
ϕ6 Verification Pilot checks for consistency of the data by verifying other
systems using the available data.
ϕ7 Failure Abnormal Function.
Sp p = T p = ¬ϕ3 ∧ ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ϕ6 ∧ ϕ7
∼df(Airspeed data) ∧ df(TCAS data) ∧ ∼df(Pitot data) ∧
df(Verification)
Output = TA/RA and Pitot readings
St t = T t = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ6 ∧ ϕ7
∼df(Invariant Data) ∧ ∼df(Altimeter Data) ∧ ∼df(TCAS
Data) ∧ df(Verification)
Output = Altitude
Sps ps = T ps = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5
∼df(Invariant Data) ∧ ∼df(Airspeed data) ∧ ∼df(Pitot data)
Output = Pitot Data
The two security domains in this scenario are SDT {TCAS domain} and SDPS {pitot
static system domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDPS and SDT ,
Sps = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ⇒ VPS∼p (6.21)
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Since the information received from the pitot static system domain is faulty, the pilot
cannot valuate for correctness of the altimeter data in that domain.
St = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ⇒ VT∼p (6.22)
Since the information received from the TCAS domain is faulty, the pilot cannot
valuate for correctness of the altimeter data in that domain.
By combining Equation 6.21 and Equation 6.22,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (Sps, St)] ∧ [w |= (VPS∼p ∧ VTp ] (6.23)
Figure 6.7. Pitot Static System Failure
Therefore, the pilot cannot deduce if the TCAS system is faulty or the pitot static
system is faulty and identify the system that is compromised.
Hence, the system is Nondeducible secure to the pilot as he cannot deduce actual
altimeter reading of the plane when there is a mismatch between the readings of TCAS and
pitot static system.
6.4.2. Scenario 2: Using Invariants. By adding invariants, the MSDND model
yields deducibility, thereby allowing critical information flow to the pilot when the pitot
static system is compromised.
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Proof: In order to make the system deducible to the pilot, invariants are used to
express the correctness of the system. In case of failure in the pitot tube, there is a possibility
to verify the correctness of the entire system by using other sources such as the Lift Reserve
Indicator (LRI) or alternate static source (See Figure 6.8).
The lift of an aircraft is calculated using the formula below.
L = (1/2)dv2sCL (6.24)
where, d is the density of the air, v is velocity of aircraft, s is the area of wing, CL is the
coefficient of lift.












where, γ = specific heat ratio of air (= 1.4), V = true airspeed and ρ = free-stream
air density.
From the above formula, true air speed can be calculated with the help of static
pressure by the alternate static system and this ensures that the system is not compromised
in such a case.
By considering the above possibilities, the correctness of the system can be verified
in case of a failure in the pitot static system by relying on the data from alternate static
source and LRI.
Table 6.8 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p, i, ps, t that can be evaluated to
determine the interactions between the pilot, TCAS and pitot static systems.
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Table 6.8. Pitot Static System Logical Conditions And States - Using Invariants
ϕi States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 Pitot Data Initiation of transmission of pressure, speed, altitude and
temperature from the pitot tube and static ports.
ϕ2 Altimeter Data Initiation of transmission of altitude reading to the TCAS
system.
ϕ3 Vertical Speed In-
dicator Data
Initiation of transmission of vertical speed to the pitot
system.
ϕ4 Airspeed Data Initiation of transmission of airspeed data to the pitot
system.
ϕ5 Altitude Data Initiation of transmission of altitude data to the TCAS
system from XPDR.
ϕ6 TCAS Altitude TCAS System knows the position of the plane and the
altitude data.
ϕ7 L Pilot knows correct airspeed value of the aircraft from
the LRI system.
ϕ8 δ Pilot knows correct altitude of the aircraft from the alter-
nate static source system.
ϕ9 Verification Pilot checks for consistency of the data by verifying in-
variant data from LRI and alternate static source.
Sp p = T p = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ6 ∧ ϕ7∧
¬ϕ8 ∧ ϕ9
∼df(Pitot Data) ∧ ∼df(Altimeter Data) ∧ ∼ df(Vertical
Speed Indicator Data) ∧ ∼ df(Airspeed Data) ∧ df(TCAS
Altitude) ∧ df(L) ∧ df(V) ∧ df(Verification)
Output = TA/RA and Pitot readings
Si i = T i = ϕ7 ∧ ϕ8 ∧ ϕ9
df(L) ∧ df(V) ∧ df(Verification)
Output = Altitude
Sps ps = T ps = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ8
∼ df(Pitot Data) ∧ ∼ df(Altimeter Data) ∧ ∼ df(Vertical
Speed Indicator Data) ∧ ∼ df(Airspeed Data)
Output = Pitot Data
St t = T t = ϕ5 ∧ ϕ6
df(Altitude Data) ∧ df(TCAS Altitude)
Output = TA/RA
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In order to verify the correctness of the airspeed data, two security domains SDP
{Pitot Static System} and SDL {LRI System} are considered. By combining the valuation
functions in SDP and SDL with respect to invariants from Equation 6.24,
Sps = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ⇒ VP∼i (6.26)
As before, the information received from the pitot static system domain is faulty and
could not valuate for correctness of the airspeed data in that domain.
Si = ϕ5 ∧ ϕ6 ∧ ϕ7 ∧ ϕ9 ⇒ ∃VPi (6.27)
Using the invariants from Equation 6.24, solving for L, the information received
from the LRI domain is not faulty and the correctness of airspeed can be valuated in that
domain.
By combining Equation 6.26 and Equation 6.27,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (sps, si)] ∧ [w |= (VP∼i ∧ ∃VPi ] (6.28)
Therefore, the system is not Nondeducible secure to the pilot. The pilot can de-
termine that the pitot static system is displaying incorrect airspeed data when there is a
mismatch between the altitude reading of pitot static system and the TCAS system by using
the data from LRI system.
In order to verify the correctness of altitude data, two security domains SDPS {Pitot
Static System} and SDAS {Alternate Static Source System} are considered. By combining
the valuation functions in SDPS and SDAS with respect to invariants from Equation 6.25,
Sps = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ⇒ VP∼i (6.29)
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As before, the information received from the pitot static system domain is faulty and
could not valuate for correctness of the altitude data in that domain.
Sas = ϕ7 ∧ ϕ8 ∧ ϕ9 ⇒ ∃VPi (6.30)
Using the invariants from Equation 6.25, solving for δ, the information received
from the Alternate Static Source domain is not faulty and could valuate for correctness of
the altitude data in that domain.
By combining Equation 6.29 and Equation 6.30,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (sps, sas)] ∧ [w |= (VP∼i ∧ ∃VPi ] (6.31)
Figure 6.8. LRI Helps To Identify The Faulty Pitot Static System
Hence, the system is not Nondeducible secure to the pilot. The pilot can determine
that the pitot static system is displaying incorrect data when there is a mismatch between the
altitude reading of pitot static system and the TCAS system by using the data from alternate
static source system.
Similarly, if there is a problem with the TCAS system, the pitot static system can
be used as the reference and rely on the data from alternate static source to verify the
correctness of the altitude displayed on the TCAS system.
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The ProVerif code in APPENDIX D proves that this attack is not Nondeducible
secure by using the alternate static source as an alternate information flow path to prove
observational equivalence. As can be interpreted from "RESULTObservational equivalence
is true (bad not derivable)", the attack can be deduced by pilot-1.
6.5. ADS-B TRANSMITTER FAILURE
This section presents two different scenarios to check if the compromised ADS-B
transmitter can be identified by the pilot.
6.5.1. Without Invariants. In case of an ADS-B transmitter compromise, the
MSDND model yields Nondeducibility, thereby stopping critical information flow to the
pilot.
Proof: Consider a scenario inwhich two aircraft, Plane-1 and Plane-2 are 10 nautical
miles (nmi) apart from each other. If there is a compromise in the ADS-B transmitter of the
Plane-1, the position information of Plane-1 received by Plane-2 is incorrect and the same
is displayed to the pilot in Plane-2. This could lead to improper communication between
both the pilots. Hence, the pilots can deduce that something is going wrong but cannot
distinguish which information is correct (See Figure 6.9).
Table 6.9 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p1, p2, a1, a2 that can be evaluated
to determine the interactions between pilot-1 and pilot-2.
Once the flight position is retrieved, pilots can observe that there is a mismatch
between the ADS-B position data. The pilot-1 cannot distinguish whether there is a failure
in the ADS-B-1 system or the ADS-B-2 system.
The two security domains in this scenario are SDP1 {pilot-1 Domain} and SDP2
{pilot-2 Domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDP1 and SDP2,
Sp1 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ⇒ VP1∼a1 (6.32)
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Table 6.9. ADS-B Logical Conditions And States - Without Invariants
ϕi States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 ADS-B Out1 Initiation of transmission of position data from Plane 1.
ϕ2 ADS-B Out2 Initiation of transmission of position data from Plane 2.
ϕ3 ADS-B In1 Reception of position data from Plane 2.
ϕ4 ADS-B In2 Reception of position data from Plane 1.
ϕ5 Display1 Pilot-1 sees the position of the Plane-2.
ϕ6 Display2 Pilot-2 sees the position of the Plane-1.
ϕ7 Communication Correct communication between pilots from Plane-1 and
Plane-2 based on the ADS-B data from both the aircraft.
Sp1 p1 = T p1 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7
∼df(ADS-B Out1)∧ df(ADS-B In1)∧ ∼df(Display1)∧
∼df(communication)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Sp2 p2 = T p2 = ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ7
df(ADS-B Out2)∧ ∼df(ADS-B In2)∧ df(Display2)∧
∼df(communication)
Output = Position of Plane-1
Sa1 a1 = T a1 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5
∼df(ADS-B Out1)∧ df(ADS-B In1)∧ ∼df(Display1)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Sa2 a2 = T a2 = ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ6
df(ADS-B Out2)∧ ∼df(ADS-B In2)∧ df(Display2)
Output = Position of Plane-1
Since the information received from the pilot-1 domain is faulty, pilot-1 cannot
valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
Sp2 = ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ⇒ VP2a1 (6.33)
Since the information received from the pilot-2 domain is faulty, pilot-2 cannot
valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
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By combining Equation 6.32 and Equation 6.33,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (Sp1, Sp2)] ∧ [w |= (VP1∼a1 ∧ VP2a1 ] (6.34)
Therefore, the pilots from both the aircraft cannot deduce the faulty ADS-B system
and identify the system that is compromised.
Hence, the system is Nondeducible secure to the pilots as they cannot deduce the
actual true position of plane-2.
Figure 6.9. Failure In ADS-B Transmitter
6.5.2. Using Invariants. In case of ADS-B transmitter compromise, but using
INS, the MSDND model yields deducibility thereby allowing critical information flow to
the pilot.
Proof: The above mentioned scenario can be made deducible to the pilot by relying
on an alternate system; i.e., INS which helps in figuring out the compromised system.
Hence, the pilots can deduce the source of incorrect information based on the invariant data
computed by the INS (See Figure 6.10).
In case of failure in the ADS-B transmitter, the pilot can make use of the INS system.
The velocity is calculated using Equation 6.4.
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Using the final velocity, distance travelled by the aircraft can be calculated using
Equation 6.5.
Note: In Table 6.10, d1 is the distance of plane-1 projected on INS-1 system and d2
is the distance travelled by plane-2 projected on INS-2 system over the same time interval.
Table 6.10 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p1, p2, a1, a2, d1, d2, i1, i2 that
can be evaluated to determine the interactions between the pilot-1 and pilot-2.
The two security domains in this scenario are SDA {ADS-BDomain} and SDI {INS
Domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDA and SDI with respect to invariants
from Equation 6.4 and Equation 6.5 in pilot’s domain,
Sa1 ∧ Sa2 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ϕ6 ⇒ VP1∼i (6.35)
Since the information received from the ADS-B domain is faulty, the pilot cannot
valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
Si1 ∧ Si2 = ϕ8 ∧ ϕ9 ∧ ϕ10 ⇒ ∃VP1i (6.36)
Using the invariants, the information received from INS domain is not faulty and
the pilot can valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
By combining Equation 6.35 and Equation 6.36,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (sa1, si1)] ∧ [w |= (VP1∼i ∧ ∃VP1i ] (6.37)
Hence, the system is not Nondeducible secure to pilot-1 and he can deduce that
ADS-B is presenting incorrect information.
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Table 6.10. ADS-B Logical Conditions And States - Using Invariants
ϕi States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 ADS-B Out1 Initiation of transmission of position data from Plane 1.
ϕ2 ADS-B Out2 Initiation of transmission of position data from Plane 2.
ϕ3 ADS-B In1 Reception of position data from Plane 2.
ϕ4 ADS-B In2 Reception of position data from Plane 1.
ϕ5 Display1 Pilot-1 sees the position of the Plane-2.
ϕ6 Display2 Pilot-2 sees the position of the Plane-1.
ϕ7 Communication Correct communication between pilots from Plane-1 and
Plane-2 based on the ADS-B data from both the aircraft.
ϕ8 d1 Pilot-1 checks the position of the plane-1 and verifies it with
the ADS-B data.
ϕ9 d2 Pilot-2 checks the position of the plane-2 and verifies it with
the ADS-B data.
ϕ10 Verification Pilot-1 and Pilot-2 checks and verifies the position of the
respective aircraft and verifies it with the position data dis-
played.
Sp1 p1 = T p1 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ∧ ϕ8 ∧ ϕ10
∼df(ADS-B Out1)∧ df(ADS-B In1)∧ ∼df(Display1)∧
∼df(communication) ∧ df(d1) ∧ df(Verification)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Sp2 p2 = T p2 = ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ∧ ϕ8 ∧ ϕ9 ∧ ϕ10
df(ADS-B Out2)∧ ∼df(ADS-B In2)∧ df(Display2)∧
∼df(communication) ∧ df(d2) ∧ df(Verification)
Output = Position of Plane-1
Sa1 a1 = T a1 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5
∼df(ADS-B Out1)∧ df(ADS-B In1)∧ ∼df(Display1)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Sa2 a2 = T a2 = ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ6
df(ADS-B Out2)∧ ∼df(ADS-B In2)∧ df(Display2)
Output = Position of Plane-1
Si1 i1 = T i1 = ϕ8 ∧ ϕ10
df(d1) ∧ df(Verification)
Output = Position of Plane-1
Si2 i2 = T i2 = ϕ9 ∧ ϕ10
df(d2) ∧ df(Verification)
Output = Position of Plane-2
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The ProVerif code in APPENDIX E proves that this attack is not Nondeducible
secure by using INS as an alternate information flow to prove observational equivalence.
As can be interpreted from "RESULTObservational equivalence is true (bad not derivable)",
the attack can be deduced by the pilots.
Figure 6.10. INS Helps To Identify The Failure In ADS-B transmitter
6.6. ADS-B, INS AND ATTACKER
This section presents two different scenarios to check if the attacker plane can be
identified by the pilot using INS and ADS-B systems.
6.6.1. Scenario 1: Without Using Invariants. In case of an attacker sending fake
signals, the MSDND model yields Nondeducibility, thereby stopping critical information
flow to the pilot.
Proof: Consider a scenario in which two aircraft, Plane-1 and Plane-2 are 10nmi
apart from each other. If pilot-2 sends fake position data to Plane-1, the position information
received by Plane-1 is incorrect. This could lead to improper communication between both
the pilots. Hence, pilot-1 can deduce that something is going wrong from the ADS-B data
and INS data, but cannot distinguish which information is correct (See Figure 6.11).
Table 6.11 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p1, p2, a1, a2, i1, i2 that can be
evaluated to determine the interactions between pilot-1 and pilot-2.
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Table 6.11. ADS-B And Attacker Logical Conditions And States - Without Invariants
ϕ j States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 ADS-B Out1 Initiation of transmission of position data from Plane 1.
ϕ2 ADS-B Out2 Initiation of transmission of position data from Plane 2.
ϕ3 ADS-B In1 Reception of position data from Plane 2.
ϕ4 ADS-B In2 Reception of position data from Plane 1.
ϕ5 Display1 Pilot-1 sees the position of the Plane-2.
ϕ6 Display2 Pilot-2 sees the position of the Plane-1.
ϕ7 d1 Pilot-1 checks the INS position of the plane-1 and verifies it
with the ADS-B data.
ϕ8 d2 Pilot-2 checks the INS position of the plane-2 and verifies it
with the ADS-B data.
ϕ7 Verification Pilot-1 and Pilot-2 checks and verifies the position of the
respective aircraft and verifies it with the position data dis-
played.
Sp1 p1 = T p1 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7
∼df(ADS-B Out1)∧ df(ADS-B In1)∧ ∼df(Display1)∧
∼df(communication)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Sp2 p2 = T p2 = ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ7
df(ADS-B Out2)∧ ∼df(ADS-B In2)∧ df(Display2)∧
∼df(communication)
Output = Position of Plane-1
Sa1 a1 = T a1 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5
∼df(ADS-B Out1)∧ df(ADS-B In1)∧ ∼df(Display1)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Sa2 a2 = T a2 = ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ6
df(ADS-B Out2)∧ ∼df(ADS-B In2)∧ df(Display2)
Output = Position of Plane-1
Si1 i1 = T i1 = ϕ8 ∧ ϕ10
df(d1) ∧ df(Verification)
Output = Position of Plane-1
Si2 i2 = T i2 = ϕ9 ∧ ϕ10
∼df(d2) ∧ df(Verification)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Once the flight position is retrieved, pilot-1 trusts the information sent by Plane-2.
Pilot-1 observes that there is a mismatch between the ADS-B position data and the INS-data.
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Pilot-1 cannot distinguish whether there is a failure in the ADS-B-1 system or the
INS system.
The two security domains in this scenario are SDP1 {pilot-1 Domain} and SDP2
{pilot-2 Domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDP1 and SDP2,
Sp1 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ⇒ VP1∼a1 (6.38)
Since the information received from the pilot-1 domain is faulty, pilot-1 cannot
valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
Sp2 = ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ⇒ VP2a1 (6.39)
Since the information received from the pilot-2 domain is faulty, pilot-2 cannot
valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
By combining Equation 6.38 and Equation 6.39,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (Sp1, Sp2)] ∧ [w |= (VP1∼a1 ∧ VP2a1 ] (6.40)
Therefore, pilot-1 cannot deduce that pilot-2 is sending fake signals and identify the
system that is compromised.
Hence, the system is Nondeducible secure to pilot-1 as he/she cannot deduce the
actual true position of plane-2.
6.6.2. Scenario 2: Using Invariants. In case of an attacker sending fake signals,
but using TCAS, the MSDND model yields deducibility thereby allowing critical informa-
tion flow to the pilot.
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Figure 6.11. Attacker Sends Fake Position Data To Pilot-1
Proof: The above mentioned scenario can be made deducible to pilot-1 by relying
on an alternate system; i.e., TCAS which helps in figuring out the compromised system.
Hence, pilot-1 can deduce the source of incorrect information based on the invariant data
computed by TCAS.
Consider a scenario in which two aircraft, Plane-1 and Plane-2 are 10nmi apart
from each other. If pilot-2 sends fake position data to Plane-1, the position information
received by Plane-1 is incorrect. This could lead to improper communication between both
the pilots. Hence, pilot-1 can deduce that something is going wrong from the ADS-B data
and INS data, but cannot distinguish which information is correct (See Figure 6.12).
Table 6.12 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p1, p2, a1, a2, t that can be
evaluated to determine the interactions between pilot-1 and pilot-2.
Once the flight position is retrieved from TCAS-1, pilot-1 does not trust the in-
formation sent by Plane-2. Pilot-1 relies on the TCAS data and follows the RA given by
TCAS-1 system.
TCAS computes the closure rate of each target within surveillance range based on
the surveillance reports (slant range, bearing and altitude) provided each second, in order to
determine the time in seconds to Closest Point of Approach (CPA), and the horizontal miss
distance at CPA. If the target aircraft is equipped with an altitude-coding transponder, the
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Table 6.12. ADS-B And Attacker Logical Conditions And States - Using Invariants
ϕi States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 ADS-B Out1 Initiation of transmission of position data from Plane 1.
ϕ2 ADS-B Out2 Initiation of transmission of position data from Plane 2.
ϕ3 ADS-B In1 Reception of position data from Plane 2.
ϕ4 ADS-B In2 Reception of position data from Plane 1.
ϕ5 Display1 Pilot-1 sees the position of the Plane-2.
ϕ6 Display2 Pilot-2 sees the position of the Plane-1.
ϕ7 TCAS-1 TCAS system knows the position of plane-1 and plane-2.
ϕ8 Displayt Pilot-1 checks the TCAS position of the plane-2 and follows
the RA given by TCAS.
Sp1 p1 = T p1 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ϕ7 ∧ ϕ8
∼df(ADS-B Out1)∧ df(ADS-B In1)∧ ∼df(Display1)∧
∼df(communication)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Sp2 p2 = T p2 = ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ7
df(ADS-B Out2)∧ ∼df(ADS-B In2)∧ df(Display2)∧
∼df(communication)
Output = Position of Plane-1
Sa1 a1 = T a1 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5
∼df(ADS-B Out1)∧ df(ADS-B In1)∧ ∼df(Display1)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Sa2 a2 = T a2 = ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ6
df(ADS-B Out2)∧ ∼df(ADS-B In2)∧ df(Display2)
Output = Position of Plane-1
Si i = T t = ϕ7 ∧ ϕ8
df(TCAS-1) ∧ df(Displayt)
Output = Position of Plane-1 and Plane-2
TCAS calculates the altitude of the target at CPA. The intruder’s vertical speed is obtained
by measuring the time it takes to cross successive 100-foot or 25- foot altitude increments,
which depends upon the type of altitude coding transponder. The TCAS system uses the
data from its own aircraft pressure altimeter, either directly from the altitude encoder or
Air Data Computer (ADC). In this way, it determines its own aircraft altitude, vertical rate,
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and the relative altitude of each target. The outputs from the TCAS tracking algorithm
(target range, horizontal miss distance at CPA, closure rate and relative altitude of the target
aircraft) are supplied to the traffic advisory and threat detection algorithms.
The two security domains in this scenario are SDP1 {pilot-1 Domain} and SDP2
{pilot-2 Domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDP1 and SDP2 with respect
to invariants in them from TCAS domain,
Sp1 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ϕ7 ∧ ϕ8 ⇒ ∃VP1i (6.41)
Since the information received from the TCAS-1 domain is not faulty, pilot-1 can
valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
Sp2 = ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ⇒ VP1∼i (6.42)
Since the information received from the pilot-2 domain is faulty, pilot-1 cannot
valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
By combining Equation 6.41 and Equation 6.42,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (Sp1, Sp2)] ∧ [w |= (∃VP1i ∧ VP1i ] (6.43)
Therefore, pilot-1 can deduce that pilot-2 is sending fake position data and identify
the system that is compromised.
Hence, the system is not Nondeducible secure to pilot-1 as he cannot deduce the
actual true position of plane-2.
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Figure 6.12. TCAS Helps To Identify The Attacker Plane
The ProVerif code in APPENDIX F proves that this attack is not Nondeducible
secure when the TCAS system is used as an alternate information flow path. As can be
interpreted from "RESULT not attacker(XY_Coord_Node_1[]) is false", the attacker plane
is present in coordinate 1.
6.7. ADS-B AND RF INTERFERENCE
In case of RF interference, the MSDND model yields Nondeducibility, thereby
stopping critical information flow to the pilots.
Proof: Consider a scenario in which two aircraft, Plane-1 and Plane-2 are 10nmi
apart from each other. The pilots communicate with each other on 1090ES band. In case
of an RF interference, the communication path between both the planes is disrupted and
incorrect information is transmitted to both the pilots. Hence, the pilots cannot deduce that
something is going wrong and this could lead to a potential collision (See Figure 6.13).
Table 6.13 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p1, p2, a1, a2 that can be evalu-
ated to determine the interactions between pilot-1 and pilot-2.
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Table 6.13. RF Interference Logical Conditions And States - Without Invariants
ϕ j States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 ADS-B Out1 Initiation of transmission of position data from Plane 1.
ϕ2 ADS-B Out2 Initiation of transmission of position data from Plane 2.
ϕ3 RF Interference RF Interference caused by the attacker.
ϕ4 ADS-B In1 Reception of position data from Plane 2.
ϕ5 ADS-B In2 Reception of position data from Plane 1.
ϕ6 Display1 Pilot-1 sees the position of the Plane-2.
ϕ7 Display2 Pilot-2 sees the position of the Plane-1.
ϕ8 Communication Incorrect communication between pilots from Plane-1 and
Plane-2 based on the received ADS-B data.
Sp1 p1 = T p1 = ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ8
df(ADS-B Out1)∧ ∼df(RF Interference) ∧ ∼df(ADS-B
In1)∧ ∼df(Display1)∧ ∼df(communication)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Sp2 p2 = T p2 = ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ∧ ¬ϕ8
df(ADS-B Out2)∧ ∼df(RF Interference) ∧ ∼df(ADS-B
In2)∧ ∼df(Display2)∧ ∼df(communication)
Output = Position of Plane-1
Sa1 a1 = T a1 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5
∼df(ADS-B Out1)∧ df(ADS-B In1)∧ ∼df(Display1)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Sa2 a2 = T a2 = ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ϕ6
df(ADS-B Out2)∧ ∼df(ADS-B In2)∧ df(Display2)
Output = Position of Plane-1
The two security domains in this scenario are SDA {ADS-BDomain} and SDI {INS
Domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDA and SDI with respect to invariants
in them from pilot’s domain,
Sa1 ∧ Sa2 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ϕ6 ⇒ VP1∼i (6.44)
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Since the information received from the ADS-B domain is faulty, the pilot cannot
valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
Si1 ∧ Si2 = ϕ8 ∧ ϕ9 ∧ ϕ10 ⇒ ∃VP1i (6.45)
By combining Equation 6.44 and Equation 6.45,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (sa1, si1)] ∧ [w |= (VP1∼i ∧ ∃VP1i ] (6.46)
Figure 6.13. RF Interference
Hence, the system is not Nondeducible secure to pilot-1 and he/she can deduce that
ADS-B is presenting incorrect information.
The ProVerif code in APPENDIX G proves that this attack is Nondeducible secure
as there is no alternate information flow to prove observational equivalence. As can be
interpreted from "RESULT Observational equivalence cannot be proved (bad derivable)",
the attack cannot be deduced by the pilots.
6.8. ADS-B AND SATELLITE FAILURE
In case of satellite (GNSS) failure, the MSDND model yields Nondeducibility,
thereby stopping critical information flow to the pilots.
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Proof: Consider a scenario in which two aircraft, Plane-1 and Plane-2 are 10nmi
apart from each other. GNSS is responsible for sending the position data to the planes and
the planes communicate with each other. In case of GNSS failure, the position information
retrieved by both the planes is incorrect and the pilots communicate with each other based
on this information. Hence, the pilots cannot deduce that something is going wrong and
this could lead to a potential collision (See Figure 6.14).
Table 6.14 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p1, p2, a1, a2 that can be evalu-
ated to determine the interactions between pilot-1 and pilot-2.
Table 6.14. Satellite Failure Logical Conditions And States - Without Invariants
ϕi States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 GNSS Initiation of transmission of position data to plane-1 and
plane-2.
ϕ2 ADS-B Out1 Initiation of transmission of position data from Plane-1.
ϕ3 ADS-B Out2 Initiation of transmission of position data from Plane-2.
ϕ4 ADS-B In1 Reception of position data from Plane 2.
ϕ5 ADS-B In2 Reception of position data from Plane 1.
ϕ6 Display1 Pilot-1 sees the position of the Plane-2.
ϕ7 Display2 Pilot-2 sees the position of the Plane-1.
ϕ8 Communication Incorrect communication between pilots from Plane-1 and
Plane-2 based on the received ADS-B data.
Sp1 p1 = T p1 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ8
∼df(GNSS) ∧ ∼df(ADS-B Out1)∧ ∼df(ADS-B In1)∧
∼df(Display1)∧ ∼df(communication)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Sp2 p2 = T p2 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ∧ ¬ϕ8
∼df(GNSS) ∧ ∼df(ADS-B Out2)∧ ∼df(ADS-B In2)∧
∼df(Display2)∧ ∼df(communication)
Output = Position of Plane-1
Sa1 a1 = T a1 = ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ6
∼df(ADS-B Out1)∧ ∼df(ADS-B In1)∧ ∼df(Display1)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Sa2 a2 = T a2 = ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7
∼df(ADS-B Out2)∧ ∼df(ADS-B In2)∧ ∼df(Display2)
Output = Position of Plane-1
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Once the flight position is retrieved, pilot-1 trusts the information sent by Plane-2
and vice-versa. Pilot-1 and pilot-2 cannot identify the problem until they are too close
which eventually leads to breakdown in the separation.
The two security domains in this scenario are SDP1 {pilot-1 Domain} and SDP2
{pilot-2 Domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDP1 and SDP2,
Sp1 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ8 ⇒ VP1∼a2 (6.47)
Since the information received from the pilot-2 domain is faulty, pilot-1 cannot
valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
Sp2 = ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ∧ ¬ϕ8 ⇒ VP2∼a1 (6.48)
Since the information received from the pilot-1 domain is faulty, pilot-2 cannot
valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
By combining Equation 6.47 and Equation 6.48,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (Sp1, Sp2)] ∧ [w |= (VP1∼a2 ∧ VP2∼a1] (6.49)
Therefore, the pilots from both the aircraft cannot deduce that satellite failure is
causing the transmission of incorrect information.
Hence, the system is Nondeducible secure to the pilots as they cannot deduce actual
true position of the planes.
The ProVerif code in APPENDIX H proves that this attack is Nondeducible secure
as there is no alternate information flow to prove observational equivalence. As can be
interpreted from "RESULT Observational equivalence cannot be proved (bad derivable)",
the attack cannot be deduced by the pilots.
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Figure 6.14. Satellite Failure
6.9. TCAS AND ATC CONTROLLER
This section presents two different scenarios to check if the incorrect commands
from ATC can be identified by the pilot.
6.9.1. Scenario 1: Without Using Invariants. In case of incorrect commands
from the ATC controller, the MSDND model yields Nondeducibility, thereby stopping
critical information flow to the pilots.
Proof: Consider a scenario in which two aircraft, Plane-1 and Plane-2 are 10nmi
apart from each other. The TCAS system sends climb RA to plane-1 and descend RA
to plane-2. Due to delay in the reception of data from the both the planes, ATC instructs
plane-2 to descend which induces pilot-2 to manoeuvre, overriding the initial RAs. Notably,
reversing the on going RA is not feasible while aircraft are manoeuvring in the vertical
dimension and are at co-altitude. This can lead to delaying the decision to reverse if both
aircraft are climbing or descending at similar vertical speeds which eventually leads to
collision (See Figure 6.15).
Table 6.15 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p1, p2, c that can be evaluated
to determine the interactions between pilot-1 and pilot-2.
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Table 6.15. TCAS And ATC Logical Conditions And States - Without Invariants
ϕ j States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 TCAS-1 Initiation of transmission of "descend RA" to plane-1.
ϕ2 TCAS-2 Initiation of transmission of "climb RA" to Plane-2.
ϕ3 Display1 Pilot-1 sees the position of the Plane-2 .
ϕ4 Display2 Pilot-2 sees the position of the Plane-1.
ϕ5 ATC Command Initiation of transmission of "descend RA" to Plane-2.
ϕ6 Pilot-2 Pilot-2 follows the ATC instruction and descends.
ϕ7 Communication Incorrect communication between pilots from Plane-1 and
Plane-2 based on the received RA’s.
Sp1 p1 = T p1 = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ7
df(TCAS-1) ∧ df(Display1)∧ ∼df(communication)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Sp2 p2 = T p2 = ϕ2 ∧ ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ7
df(TCAS-2) ∧ df(Display2)∧ ∼df(ATC Command) ∧
∼df(Pilot-2) ∧ ∼df(communication)
Output = Position of Plane-1
Sc c = T c = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7
df(TCAS-1) ∧ df(TCAS-2) ∧ ∼df(ATC Command) ∧
∼df(Communication)
Output = Position of Plane-1 and Plane-2
Once the flight position is retrieved, pilot-1 trusts the information sent by Plane-2
and ATC controller and vice-versa. Pilot-1 and pilot-2 cannot identify the problem until
they are too close which eventually leads to breakdown in the separation.
The two security domains in this scenario are SDP1 {pilot-1 Domain} and SDP2
{pilot-2 Domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDP1 and SDP2,
Sp1 = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ⇒ VP1c (6.50)
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Since the information received from the pilot-2 domain is faulty, pilot-1 cannot
valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
Sp2 = ϕ2 ∧ ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ⇒ VP2∼c (6.51)
Since the information received from the pilot-1 domain is faulty, pilot-2 cannot
valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
By combining Equation 6.50 and Equation 6.51,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (Sp1, Sp2)] ∧ [w |= (VP1c ∧ VP2∼c ] (6.52)
Figure 6.15. Conflict Between ATC And TCAS Commands
Therefore, the pilots from both the aircraft cannot deduce whether TCAS-2 is faulty
or the ATC controller instructed wrong commands.
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Hence, the system is Nondeducible secure to the pilots as they cannot deduce the
correctness of ATC commands.
6.9.2. Scenario 2: Using Invariants. In case of incorrect commands from theATC
controller, but using ADS-B system, the MSDND model yields Nondeducibility, thereby
allowing critical information flow to the pilots.
Proof: The above mentioned scenario can be avoided by relying on alternate in-
formation flow path. ADS-B system can serve as this alternate source to provide position
data. This helps the pilots to verify the position when they are on the same flight level and
in close proximity (See Figure 6.16).
Table 6.16 presents the set of logical conditions, ϕi, p1, p2, c, a1, a2 that can be
evaluated to determine the interactions between pilot-1 and pilot-2.
Once the flight position is retrieved, pilot-1 trusts the information sent by Plane-2
and ATC controller and vice-versa. When both the pilots verify the TCAS position data and
ADS-B position data, pilot-1 can deduce that ATC has given incorrect commands. Thus,
the pilots can avoid collision by relying on the ADS-B data.
For each aircraft being tracked, the receiver calculates how long the satellite signal
took to reach it, as follows:
Propagation Time = Time Signal Reached Receiver - Time Signal Left Satellite
Pt = Rt − Lt (6.53)
Multiplying this propagation time by the speed of light gives the distance to the
satellite.
Sd = Pt ∗ Sl (6.54)
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Table 6.16. TCAS And ATC Logical Conditions And States - Using Invariants
ϕ j States Functions
ϕ0 Normal Plane functions normally.
ϕ1 TCAS-1 Initiation of transmission of "descend RA" to plane-1.
ϕ2 TCAS-2 Initiation of transmission of "climb RA" to Plane-2.
ϕ3 Display1 Pilot-1 sees the position of the Plane-2 .
ϕ4 Display2 Pilot-2 sees the position of the Plane-1.
ϕ5 ATC Command Initiation of transmission of "descend RA" to Plane-2.
ϕ6 Pilot-2 Pilot-2 follows the ATC instruction and descends.
ϕ7 Communication Incorrect communication between pilots from Plane-1 and
Plane-2 based on the received RA’s.
ϕ8 ADS-B-1 Initiation of transmission of position data to Plane-2.
ϕ9 ADS-B-2 Initiation of transmission of position data to Plane-1.
ϕ10 Verification Pilot-1 and Pilot-2 check and verify the position of the respec-
tive aircraft and verify it with the position data displayed.
Sp1 p1 = T p1 = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ∧ ϕ8 ∧ ϕ10
df(TCAS-1) ∧ df(Display1)∧ ∼df(Communication) ∧
df(ADS-B-1) ∧ df(Verification)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Sp2 p2 = T p2 = ϕ2 ∧ ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ∧ ϕ9 ∧ ϕ10
df(TCAS-2) ∧ df(Display2)∧ ∼df(ATC Command) ∧
∼df(Pilot-2) ∧ ∼df(Communication) ∧ df(ADS-B-2) ∧
df(Verification)
Output = Position of Plane-1
Sc c = T c = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7
df(TCAS-1) ∧ df(TCAS-2) ∧ ∼df(ATC Command) ∧
∼df(Communication) ∧ df(Verification)
Output = Position of Plane-1 and Plane-2
Sa1 a1 = T a1 = ϕ8
df(ADS-B-1)
Output = Position of Plane-2
Sa2 a2 = T a2 = ϕ9
df(ADS-B-2)
Output = Position of Plane-1
For each satellite being tracked, the receiver now knows where the satellite was at
the time of transmission and it has determined the distance to the satellite when it was there.
Using trilateration, a method of geometrically determining the position of an object, in a
manner similar to triangulation, the receiver calculates its position.
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The two security domains in this scenario are SDC {controller Domain} and SDP
{pilot-1 and pilot-2 Domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDC and SDP with
respect to the invariants from ADS-B domain with respect to invariants from Equation 6.53
and Equation 6.54 in ADS-B domain,
Sc = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ⇒ VC∼i (6.55)
Since the information received from the controller domain is faulty, the pilots cannot
valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
Sp = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3 ∧ ϕ4 ∧ ¬ϕ5 ∧ ¬ϕ6 ∧ ¬ϕ7 ∧ ϕ8 ∧ ϕ9 ∧ ϕ10 ⇒ ∃VPi (6.56)
Since the information received from the pilot-1 and pilot-2 domain is not faulty, the
pilots can valuate for correctness of the position data in that domain.
By combining Equation 6.55 and Equation 6.56,
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W : [w `  f (Sc, Sp)] ∧ [w |= (VC∼i ∧ ∃VPi )] (6.57)
Therefore, the pilots can deduce that ATC controller instructed with wrong com-
mands and pilots can follow the initial RAs issued by the TCAS system.
Hence, the system is not Nondeducible secure to the pilots as they can deduce the
correctness of ATC commands.
The ProVerif code inAPPENDIX I proves that this attack is not Nondeducible secure
when ADS-B is used as an alternate information flow path. As can be interpreted from
"RESULT not attacker(XY_Coord[]) is false", the TCAS is sending incorrect commands.
Table 6.17 presents the summary of attack scenarios and the corresponding invariants
source used to identify the attack.
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Figure 6.16. ADS-B Helps Identify The Incorrect Commands From ATC
Table 6.17. Summary Of The Attack Scenarios
Scenario MSDND Secure Invariants Source
Radar Transponder Failure No INS, ADS-B
Radar Transponder Failure and TCAS No INS, ADS-B
Altimeter Failure No INS, ADS-B
Pitot Static System Failure No Alternate static source, LRI
ADS-B Transmitter Failure No INS
ADS-B, INS and Attacker No TCAS
ADS-B and RF Interference Yes NA
ADS-B and Satellite Failure Yes NA
TCAS and ATC Controller No ADS-B
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7. FUTUREWORK
The introduction of an automated, decentralized airspace system and the aircraft
flying in that airspace system, leads to some unique CPS challenges and open problems.
The air traffic control network will be used by manned and unmanned air vehicles in the
shared airspace and additionally be used for distribution of large volumes of potentially non-
safety critical data, e.g., traffic information and updates from ground systems. Furthermore,
with growth of programs such as "fly-by-wireless" [10], an on-board wireless network
communicates advisory and eventually time-critical data, will be increasingly an option for
aviation. This results in a complex system with a huge number of information flow paths
between various systems in the aircraft. The MSDND model must exhibit deducibility for
time critical operations under above specified conditions, e.g., in terms of deducing the
attack when the traffic is high. Hence the performance of MSDND in mixed traffic loads
must be studied for future aircraft. Furthermore, risks from tight cyber-physical integration
must be assessed for their potential impact on physical behavior and performance gains of
future aircraft and airspace systems.
A strategic and generalized way to partition the security domains is needed. While
in this thesis, the assignment of security domains to physical domains seems natural, it is
expected that this will not always be the case. A formal proof is needed that quantifies the
security domains and assesses the number of information flow paths that can be corrupted
and still maintain deducibility. In the future, systems, equipment and components will
have their own intelligence and communication abilities, which makes the cyber-physical
interactions more complex. Focus can be laid on building a fully automated tool to automate
the MSDND analysis by partitioning the CPS into security domains, devise attack scenarios
and provide alternatives to overcome bottlenecks in the overall system.
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There are technical challenges associated with tightening the cyber-physical inte-
gration within aircraft and between aircraft and off-board systems. Most aviation standards
do not yet cover cyber-physical threats. Several aviation regulatory agencies have started
creating regulations (e.g., Special Conditions) to address cyber security (e.g., network se-
curity) and physical security (e.g., onboard RF interference) concerns [10]. Physical risks
from bad weather, icing, winds, solar flares, can also impact cyber performance (e.g., GPS
outage due to solar flares).
Future work also includes extending the MSDND model to include entire aviation
systems, as well as identifying and assessing aviation cyber-physical risks.
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8. CONCLUSION
Viewing the security domains as single high and low domains is not adequate as it
does not cover all the possible combinations of the states. The MSDND model is used to
analyze the information flow paths in complex CPS and this model is applied to a specific
CPS, air traffic surveillance systems, with quick response times. This model fits the complex
CPS better compared to other models, because it considers all the possible combinations
of states and applies MSDND to check for the deducibility. The MSDND model shows
where the vulnerabilities lie and shows where additional inputs or invariants are needed to
mitigate the vulnerabilities.
This thesis considers possible attacks and malfunctions in the air traffic surveillance
systems. The benefits of tightening the cyber-physical interactions of airborne computer
systems, however, is at the cost of exposure to potential vulnerabilities. The thesis noted that
the CPS can be partitioned into multiple overlapping security domains and the information
flow paths between these domains can be fundamentally viewed as a security function
for mitigating vulnerability exposure, but these information flow paths are also subject to
failure and intentional disruption. A system sending information to other systems has to
be evaluated for effectiveness, including failure impact and required reliability. This thesis
is aimed at evaluating the security domains and the associated paths, using various attack
scenarios to identify the attack. Given an attack scenario and the source of the attack,
MSDNDmakes use of the invariants present in the system to provide an alternative to avoid
the attack.
This thesis provided a CPS vision for future aviation information systems of aircraft.
The presented MSDND analysis offers new insights on the security analysis of aircraft






(∗ De f i n i ng use r −d e f i n e d d a t a t ype as Coo r d i n a t e s ∗ )
t yp e Coord .
(∗ Va r i a b l e s , Names and Types ∗ )
(∗ Making channe l c p r i v a t e f o r s e c u r e t r a n s f e r o f d a t a ∗ )
f r e e c : c h anne l [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e ch : ch anne l .
f r e e Accept : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Reques t : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e XY_Coord : Coord .
(∗ que ry t o s e e i f a t t a c k e r can o b t a i n any of t h e messages ∗ )
que ry a t t a c k e r ( Accept ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( Reques t ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord ) .
(∗ P ro c e s s 1 a t ATC ∗ )
l e t ATC=
(∗ Reques t s e n t t o on ly F l i g h t A∗ )
ou t ( ch , Reques t ) ;
(∗ Coo r d i n a t e s a r e r e c e i v e d from F l i g h t A, and a r e s t o r e d
i n XY_Location ∗ )
i n ( c , XY_Location : Coord ) ;
i f XY_Location = XY_Coord t h en
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(∗ Coo r d i n a t e s a r e a c c e p t e d ∗ )
ou t ( c , Accept ) .
(∗ P ro c e s s 2 a t F l i g h t A TCAS∗ )
l e t TCAS_FlightA=
(∗ Reques t i s t a k en by F l i g h t A ∗ )
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
(∗ Coo r d i n a t e s a r e s e n t a s r e s p on s e ∗ )
ou t ( ch , XY_Coord ) .
(∗ P a r a l l e l Compos i t ion o f ATC and F l i g h t A TCAS p r o c e s s e s ∗ )
p r o c e s s
( ( ! ATC) | ( ! TCAS_FlightA ) )
OUTPUT:
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord [ ] )
goa l r e a c h a b l e : a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord [ ] ) i s f a l s e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] )
goa l r e a c h a b l e : a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] ) i s f a l s e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( Accept [ ] )
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Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( Accept [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( Accept [ ] ) i s t r u e .
APPENDIX B
RADAR TRANSPONDER FAILURE AND TCAS
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CODE:
(∗ De f i n i ng use r −d e f i n e d d a t a t ype as Coo r d i n a t e s ∗ )
t yp e Coord .
(∗ Va r i a b l e s , Names and Types ∗ )
(∗ Making channe l c p r i v a t e f o r s e c u r e t r a n s f e r o f d a t a ∗ )
f r e e c : c h anne l [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e ch : ch anne l .
f r e e Accept : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Reques t : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e XY_Coord : Coord .
(∗ que ry t o s e e i f a t t a c k e r can o b t a i n any of t h e messages ∗ )
que ry a t t a c k e r ( Accept ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( Reques t ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord ) .
(∗ P ro c e s s 1 a t ATC ∗ )
l e t ATC=
(∗ Reques t s e n t t o on ly F l i g h t A∗ )
ou t ( ch , Reques t ) ;
(∗ Coo r d i n a t e s a r e r e c e i v e d from F l i g h t A, and a r e
s t o r e d i n XY_Location ∗ )
i n ( c , XY_Location : Coord ) ;
i f XY_Location = XY_Coord t h en
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(∗ Coo r d i n a t e s a r e a c c e p t e d ∗ )
ou t ( c , Accept ) .
(∗ P ro c e s s 2 a t F l i g h t A TCAS∗ )
l e t TCAS_FlightA=
(∗ Reques t i s t a k en by F l i g h t A ∗ )
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
(∗ Coo r d i n a t e s a r e s e n t a s r e s p on s e ∗ )
ou t ( ch , XY_Coord ) .
(∗ P ro c e s s 3 a t F l i g h t B TCAS∗ )
l e t TCAS_FlightB=
(∗ Reques t i s t a k en by F l i g h t B ∗ )
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
(∗ Coo r d i n a t e s a r e s e n t a s r e s p on s e ∗ )
ou t ( ch , XY_Coord ) .
p r o c e s s
( ( ! ATC) | ( ! TCAS_FlightA ) | ( ! TCAS_FlightB ) )
OUTPUT:
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord [ ] )
goa l r e a c h a b l e : a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord [ ] )
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RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord [ ] ) i s f a l s e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] )
goa l r e a c h a b l e : a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] ) i s f a l s e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( Accept [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( Accept [ ] )





(∗ De f i n i ng use r −d e f i n e d d a t a t ype as Coo r d i n a t e s ∗ )
t yp e Coord .
(∗ Va r i a b l e s , Names and Types ∗ )
(∗ Making channe l c p r i v a t e f o r s e c u r e t r a n s f e r o f d a t a ∗ )
f r e e c : c h anne l [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e ch : ch anne l .
f r e e Accept : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Reques t : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e XY_Coord : Coord [ p r i v a t e ] .
(∗ que ry t o s e e i f a t t a c k e r can o b t a i n any of t h e messages ∗ )
que ry a t t a c k e r ( Accept ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( Reques t ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord ) .
(∗ TCAS A l t im e t e r p r o c e s s 1 a t F l i gh tA ∗ )
l e t TCAS_Alt i_Fl ightA=
(∗ Reques t s e n t t o on ly F l i g h t B∗ )
ou t ( c , Reques t ) ;
(∗ Coo r d i n a t e s r e c e i v e d from F l i g h t B∗ )
i n ( c , XY_Location : Coord ) ;
i f XY_Location = XY_Coord t h en
(∗ Coo r d i n a t e s a r e a c c e p t e d ∗ )
ou t ( ch , Accept ) .
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(∗ TCAS p r o c e s s 2 a t F l i g h t B ∗ )
l e t TCAS_FlightB=
(∗ Reques t i s t a k en by F l i g h t B ∗ )
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
(∗ Coo r d i n a t e s a r e s e n t a s r e s p on s e ∗ )
ou t ( c , XY_Coord ) .
p r o c e s s
( ( ! TCAS_Alt i_Fl ightA ) | ( ! TCAS_FlightB ) )
OUTPUT:
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord [ ] ) i s t r u e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] ) i s t r u e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( Accept [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( Accept [ ] )
goa l r e a c h a b l e : a t t a c k e r ( Accept [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( Accept [ ] ) i s f a l s e .
APPENDIX D
PITOT STATIC SYSTEM FAILURE
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CODE:
t y p e ne tVa lue .
t yp e P .
(∗ Va r i a b l e s , Names and Types ∗ )
f r e e c : c h anne l .
f r e e c_phy : ch anne l [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e ch : ch anne l [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e S t a t u s : b i t s t r i n g . f r e e Reques t : b i t s t r i n g .
f r e e Response : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e S e l e c t : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Sa fe : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Unsafe : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] . f r e e Se t : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e p1 , p2 : P [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e p3 : P . f r e e d e l t a 1 , d e l t a 2 , d e l t a 3 : n e tVa l ue [ p r i v a t e ] .
(∗ I n v a r i a n t p r o c e s s ∗ )
fun Inv ( P ) : n e tVa lue . r educ f o r a l l p : P ,
v a l u e : n e tVa l ue ; pos ( Inv ( p ) , v a l u e )= va l u e .
(∗ P i t o t S t a t i c System p r o c e s s ∗ )
l e t P i t o t =
ou t ( c , Reques t ) ;
i n ( ch , x_Response : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Response = Response t h en
ou t ( ch , c ho i c e [ Safe , Unsafe ] ) ;
i n ( ch , x_Safe : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
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i f x_Safe = Sa fe t h en
ou t ( c_phy , Inv ( p1 ) ) ;
i f x_Safe = Unsafe t h en
ou t ( c , Inv ( p1 ) ) ;
l e t y=pos ( Inv ( p1 ) , d e l t a 1 ) i n
ou t ( ch , Se t ) .
(∗ TCAS System p r o c e s s ∗ )
l e t TCAS =
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
ou t ( ch , Response ) ;
i n ( ch , x _S e l e c t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x _S e l e c t = S e l e c t t h en
ou t ( ch , Sa fe ) ;
ou t ( c_phy , Inv ( p2 ) ) ;
l e t y=pos ( Inv ( p2 ) , d e l t a 2 ) i n
ou t ( ch , Se t ) .
(∗ A l t e r n a t e S t a t i c Source p r o c e s s ∗ )
l e t A l t e r n a t e =
ou t ( c , S t a t u s ) ;
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
ou t ( ch , Response ) ;
i n ( ch , x _S e l e c t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x _S e l e c t = S e l e c t t h en
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ou t ( ch , Sa fe ) ;
ou t ( c_phy , Inv ( p3 ) ) ;
l e t y=pos ( Inv ( p3 ) , d e l t a 3 ) i n
ou t ( ch , Se t ) .
p r o c e s s ( ( ! TCAS) | ( ! A l t e r n a t e ) )
OUTPUT:
−− Ob s e r v a t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n c e
Comple t ing . . .





t y p e ne tVa lue .
t yp e P .
(∗ Va r i a b l e s , Names and Types ∗ )
f r e e c : c h anne l .
f r e e c_phy : ch anne l [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e ch : ch anne l [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e S t a t u s : b i t s t r i n g . f r e e Reques t : b i t s t r i n g .
f r e e Response : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e S e l e c t : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Sa fe : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Unsafe : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] . f r e e Se t : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e p1 , p2 : P [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e p3 : P . f r e e d e l t a 1 , d e l t a 2 , d e l t a 3 : n e tVa l ue [ p r i v a t e ] .
(∗ I n v a r i a n t p r o c e s s ∗ )
fun Inv ( P ) : n e tVa lue . r educ f o r a l l p : P , v a l u e : n e tVa lue ;
pos ( Inv ( p ) , v a l u e )= va l u e .
(∗ A i r c r a f t 1 p r o c e s s ∗ )
l e t A i r c r a f t _ 1 =
ou t ( c , S t a t u s ) ;
ou t ( c , Reques t ) ;
i n ( ch , x_Response : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
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i f x_Response = Response t h en
ou t ( ch , c ho i c e [ Safe , Unsafe ] ) ;
i n ( ch , x_Safe : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Safe = Sa fe t h en ou t ( c_phy , Inv ( p1 ) ) ;
i f x_Safe = Unsafe t h en
ou t ( c , Inv ( p1 ) ) ;
l e t y=pos ( Inv ( p1 ) , d e l t a 1 ) i n
ou t ( ch , Se t ) .
(∗ A i r c r a f t 2 p r o c e s s ∗ )
l e t A i r c r a f t _ 2 =
ou t ( c , S t a t u s ) ;
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
ou t ( ch , Response ) ;
i n ( ch , x _S e l e c t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x _S e l e c t = S e l e c t t h en
ou t ( ch , Sa fe ) ;
ou t ( c_phy , Inv ( p2 ) ) ;
l e t y=pos ( Inv ( p2 ) , d e l t a 2 ) i n
ou t ( ch , Se t ) .
(∗ A i r c r a f t 3 p r o c e s s ∗ )
l e t A i r c r a f t _ 3 =
ou t ( c , S t a t u s ) ;
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i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
ou t ( ch , Response ) ;
i n ( ch , x _S e l e c t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x _S e l e c t = S e l e c t t h en
ou t ( ch , Unsafe ) ;
ou t ( c_phy , Inv ( p3 ) ) ;
l e t y=pos ( Inv ( p3 ) , d e l t a 3 ) i n
ou t ( ch , Se t ) .
p r o c e s s ( ( ! A i r c r a f t _ 2 ) | ( ! A i r c r a f t _ 3 ) )
OUTPUT:
−− Ob s e r v a t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n c e
Comple t ing . . .
RESULT Ob s e r v a t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n c e i s t r u e ( bad no t d e r i v a b l e ) .
APPENDIX F
ADS-B, INS AND ATTACKER
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CODE:
(∗ De f i n i ng use r −d e f i n e d d a t a t ype as Coo r d i n a t e s ∗ )
t yp e Coord .
(∗ Va r i a b l e s , Names and Types ∗ )
(∗ Making channe l c p r i v a t e f o r s e c u r e t r a n s f e r o f d a t a ∗ )
f r e e c : c h anne l [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Accept : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Reques t : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e XY_Coord_Node_1 : Coord .
f r e e XY_Coord_Node_2 : Coord [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e XY_Coord_Node_3 : Coord [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e XY_Coord_Node_4 : Coord [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e XY_Coord_Node_5 : Coord [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e XY_Coord_Node_6 : Coord [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e XY_Coord_Node_7 : Coord [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e XY_Coord_Node_8 : Coord [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e XY_Coord_Node_9 : Coord [ p r i v a t e ] .
(∗ que ry t o s e e i f a t t a c k e r can o b t a i n any of t h e messages ∗ )
que ry a t t a c k e r ( Accept ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( Reques t ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_1 ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_2 ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_3 ) .
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query a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_4 ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_5 ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_6 ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_7 ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_8 ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_9 ) .
(∗ Comm p ro c e s s 1 a t F l i gh tA ∗ )
l e t Comm_FlightA=
(∗ Reques t s e n t t o on ly F l i g h t B∗ )
ou t ( c , Reques t ) ;
i n ( c , XY_Location : Coord ) ;
i f XY_Location = XY_Coord_Node_1 | | XY_Location =
XY_Coord_Node_2 | | XY_Location = XY_Coord_Node_3 | |
XY_Location = XY_Coord_Node_4 | | XY_Location =
XY_Coord_Node_5 | | XY_Location = XY_Coord_Node_6 | |
XY_Location = XY_Coord_Node_7 | | XY_Location =
XY_Coord_Node_8 | | XY_Location = XY_Coord_Node_9 t h en
ou t ( c , Accept ) .
(∗ P ro c e s s 2 a t Node_1 ∗ )
l e t Quad_Node_1=
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
ou t ( c , XY_Coord_Node_1 ) .
(∗ p r o c e s s 2 a t Node_2 ∗ )
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l e t Quad_Node_2=
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
ou t ( c , XY_Coord_Node_2 ) .
(∗ p r o c e s s 2 a t Node_3 ∗ )
l e t Quad_Node_3=
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
ou t ( c , XY_Coord_Node_3 ) .
(∗ p r o c e s s 2 a t Node_4 ∗ )
l e t Quad_Node_4=
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
ou t ( c , XY_Coord_Node_4 ) .
(∗ p r o c e s s 2 a t Node_5 ∗ )
l e t Quad_Node_5=
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
ou t ( c , XY_Coord_Node_5 ) .
(∗ p r o c e s s 2 a t Node_6 ∗ )
l e t Quad_Node_6=
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
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ou t ( c , XY_Coord_Node_6 ) .
(∗ p r o c e s s 2 a t Node_7 ∗ )
l e t Quad_Node_7=
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
ou t ( c , XY_Coord_Node_7 ) .
(∗ p r o c e s s 2 a t Node_8 ∗ )
l e t Quad_Node_8=
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
ou t ( c , XY_Coord_Node_8 ) .
(∗ p r o c e s s 2 a t Node_9 ∗ )
l e t Quad_Node_9=
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
ou t ( c , XY_Coord_Node_9 ) .
p r o c e s s
( ( ! Comm_FlightA ) |
( ! Quad_Node_1 ) | ( ! Quad_Node_2 ) | ( ! Quad_Node_3 ) |
( ! Quad_Node_4 ) | ( ! Quad_Node_5 ) | ( ! Quad_Node_6 ) |
( ! Quad_Node_7 ) | ( ! Quad_Node_8 ) | ( ! Quad_Node_9 ) )
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OUTPUT:
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_9 [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_9 [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_9 [ ] ) i s t r u e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_8 [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_8 [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_8 [ ] ) i s t r u e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_7 [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_7 [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_7 [ ] ) i s t r u e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_6 [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_6 [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_6 [ ] ) i s t r u e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_5 [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_5 [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_5 [ ] ) i s t r u e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_4 [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_4 [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_4 [ ] ) i s t r u e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_3 [ ] )
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Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_3 [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_3 [ ] ) i s t r u e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_2 [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_2 [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_2 [ ] ) i s t r u e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_1 [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_1 [ ] )
goa l r e a c h a b l e : a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_1 [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord_Node_1 [ ] ) i s f a l s e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] ) i s t r u e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( Accept [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( Accept [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( Accept [ ] ) i s t r u e .
APPENDIX G
ADS-B AND RF INTERFERENCE
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CODE:
t y p e ne tVa lue .
t yp e P .
(∗ Va r i a b l e s , Names and Types ∗ )
f r e e c : c h anne l .
f r e e c_phy : ch anne l [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e ch : ch anne l [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e S t a t u s : b i t s t r i n g .
f r e e Reques t : b i t s t r i n g .
f r e e Response : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e S e l e c t : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Sa fe : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Unsafe : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Se t : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e p1 , p2 : P [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e d e l t a 1 , d e l t a 2 : n e tVa lu e [ p r i v a t e ] .
(∗ I n v a r i a n t p r o c e s s ∗ )
fun Inv ( P ) : n e tVa lue . r educ f o r a l l p : P ,
v a l u e : n e tVa l ue ; pos ( Inv ( p ) , v a l u e )= va l u e .
(∗ A i r c r a f t 1 p r o c e s s ∗ )
l e t A i r c r a f t _ 1 =
ou t ( c , S t a t u s ) ;
ou t ( c , Reques t ) ;
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i n ( ch , x_Response : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Response = Response t h en
ou t ( ch , c ho i c e [ Safe , Unsafe ] ) ;
i n ( ch , x_Safe : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Safe = Sa fe t h en ou t ( c_phy , Inv ( p1 ) ) ;
i f x_Safe = Unsafe t h en
ou t ( c , Inv ( p1 ) ) ;
l e t y=pos ( Inv ( p1 ) , d e l t a 1 ) i n
ou t ( ch , Se t ) .
(∗ A i r c r a f t 2 p r o c e s s ∗ )
l e t A i r c r a f t _ 2 =
ou t ( c , S t a t u s ) ;
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
ou t ( ch , Response ) ;
i n ( ch , x _S e l e c t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x _S e l e c t = S e l e c t t h en
ou t ( ch , Sa fe ) ;
ou t ( c_phy , Inv ( p2 ) ) ;
l e t y=pos ( Inv ( p2 ) , d e l t a 2 ) i n
ou t ( ch , Se t ) .
p r o c e s s ( ( ! A i r c r a f t _ 2 ) | ( ! A i r c r a f t _ 1 ) )
OUTPUT:
−− Ob s e r v a t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n c e
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Te rm in a t i o n warn ing : v_237 <> v_238 && a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_236 , v_237 )
&& a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_236 , v_238 ) −> bad
S e l e c t i n g 0
Te rm in a t i o n warn ing : v_240 <> v_241 && a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_240 , v_239 )
&& a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_241 , v_239 ) −> bad
S e l e c t i n g 0
Comple t ing . . .
T e rm in a t i o n warn ing : v_237 <> v_238 && a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_236 , v_237 )
&& a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_236 , v_238 ) −> bad
S e l e c t i n g 0
Te rm in a t i o n warn ing : v_240 <> v_241 && a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_240 , v_239 )
&& a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_241 , v_239 ) −> bad
S e l e c t i n g 0
goa l r e a c h a b l e : bad
RESULT Ob s e r v a t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n c e canno t be proved
( bad d e r i v a b l e ) .
Looking f o r s i m p l i f i e d p r o c e s s e s . . .
No s i m p l i f i e d p r o c e s s found
APPENDIX H
ADS-B AND SATELLITE FAILURE
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CODE:
t y p e ne tVa lue .
t yp e P .
(∗ Va r i a b l e s , Names and Types ∗ )
f r e e c : c h anne l .
f r e e c_phy : ch anne l [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e ch : ch anne l [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e S t a t u s : b i t s t r i n g . f r e e Reques t : b i t s t r i n g .
f r e e Response : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e P o s i t i o n 1 : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e P o s i t i o n 2 : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e S e l e c t : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Sa fe : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Unsafe : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Se t : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e p1 , p2 : P [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e d e l t a 1 , d e l t a 2 : n e tVa lu e [ p r i v a t e ] .
(∗ I n v a r i a n t p r o c e s s ∗ )
fun Inv ( P ) : n e tVa lue . r educ f o r a l l p : P ,
v a l u e : n e tVa l ue ; pos ( Inv ( p ) , v a l u e )= va l u e .
(∗ S a t e l l i t e p r o c e s s ∗ )
l e t S a t e l l i t e =
ou t ( c , S t a t u s ) ;
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ou t ( ch , P o s i t i o n 1 ) ;
ou t ( ch , P o s i t i o n 2 ) .
(∗ A i r c r a f t 1 p r o c e s s ∗ )
l e t A i r c r a f t _ 1 =
ou t ( c , S t a t u s ) ;
ou t ( c , Reques t ) ;
i n ( ch , x_Response : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Response = P o s i t i o n 1 t h en
ou t ( ch , c ho i c e [ Safe , Unsafe ] ) ;
i n ( ch , x_Safe : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Safe = Sa fe t h en
ou t ( c_phy , Inv ( p1 ) ) ;
i f x_Safe = Unsafe t h en
ou t ( c , Inv ( p1 ) ) ;
l e t y=pos ( Inv ( p1 ) , d e l t a 1 ) i n
ou t ( ch , Se t ) .
(∗ A i r c r a f t 2 p r o c e s s ∗ )
l e t A i r c r a f t _ 2 =
ou t ( c , S t a t u s ) ;
ou t ( c , Reques t ) ;
i n ( c , x_Response : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Response= P o s i t i o n 2 t h en
ou t ( ch , c ho i c e [ Safe , Unsafe ] ) ;
i n ( ch , x_Safe : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Safe = Sa fe t h en
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ou t ( c_phy , Inv ( p2 ) ) ;
i f x_Safe = Unsafe t h en
ou t ( c , Inv ( p2 ) ) ;
l e t y=pos ( Inv ( p2 ) , d e l t a 2 ) i n
ou t ( ch , Se t ) .
p r o c e s s ( ( ! S a t e l l i t e ) | ( ! A i r c r a f t _ 2 ) | ( ! A i r c r a f t _ 1 ) )
OUTPUT:
−− Ob s e r v a t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n c e
Te rm in a t i o n warn ing : v_239 <> v_240 && a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_238 , v_239 )
&& a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_238 , v_240 ) −> bad
S e l e c t i n g 0
Te rm in a t i o n warn ing : v_242 <> v_243 && a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_242 , v_241 )
&& a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_243 , v_241 ) −> bad
S e l e c t i n g 0
Comple t ing . . .
T e rm in a t i o n warn ing : v_239 <> v_240 && a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_238 , v_239 )
&& a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_238 , v_240 ) −> bad
S e l e c t i n g 0
Te rm in a t i o n warn ing : v_242 <> v_243 && a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_242 , v_241 )
&& a t t a c k e r 2 ( v_243 , v_241 ) −> bad
S e l e c t i n g 0
goa l r e a c h a b l e : bad
Could no t f i n d a t r a c e c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h i s d e r i v a t i o n .
RESULT Ob s e r v a t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n c e canno t be proved
( bad d e r i v a b l e ) .
APPENDIX I
TCAS AND ATC CONTROLLER
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CODE:
(∗ De f i n i ng use r −d e f i n e d d a t a t ype as Coo r d i n a t e s ∗ )
t yp e Coord .
(∗ Va r i a b l e s , Names and Types ∗ )
(∗ Making channe l c p r i v a t e f o r s e c u r e t r a n s f e r o f d a t a ∗ )
f r e e c : c h anne l [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e ch : ch anne l .
f r e e Accept : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e Reques t : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i v a t e ] .
f r e e XY_Coord : Coord .
(∗ que ry t o s e e i f a t t a c k e r can o b t a i n any of t h e messages ∗ )
que ry a t t a c k e r ( Accept ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( Reques t ) .
que ry a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord ) .
(∗ P ro c e s s 1 a t ATC ∗ )
l e t ATC=
(∗ Reques t s e n t t o on ly F l i g h t A∗ )
ou t ( ch , Reques t ) ;
(∗ Coo r d i n a t e s a r e r e c e i v e d from F l i g h t A, and a r e
s t o r e d i n XY_Location ∗ )
i n ( c , XY_Location : Coord ) ;
i f XY_Location = XY_Coord t h en
(∗ Coo r d i n a t e s a r e a c c e p t e d ∗ )
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ou t ( c , Accept ) .
(∗ P ro c e s s 2 a t F l i g h t A TCAS∗ )
l e t TCAS_FlightA=
(∗ Reques t i s t a k en by F l i g h t A ∗ )
i n ( c , x_Reques t : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
i f x_Reques t=Reques t t h en
(∗ Coo r d i n a t e s a r e s e n t a s r e s p on s e ∗ )
ou t ( ch , XY_Coord ) .
p r o c e s s
( ( ! ATC) | ( ! TCAS_FlightA ) )
OUTPUT:
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord [ ] )
goa l r e a c h a b l e : a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( XY_Coord [ ] ) i s f a l s e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] )
Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] )
goa l r e a c h a b l e : a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( Reques t [ ] ) i s f a l s e .
−− Query no t a t t a c k e r ( Accept [ ] )
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Comple t ing . . .
S t a r t i n g que ry no t a t t a c k e r ( Accept [ ] )
RESULT no t a t t a c k e r ( Accept [ ] ) i s t r u e .
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